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The new Rwandan Government had a major challenge once the genocide against the Tutsi had 
been brought to an end. How would it be possible to bring justice to the millions of suspects due 
to the fact that the planners of the genocide tried to involve all Hutu in the murder of the Inyenzi 
(Tutsi and their moderate Hutu)? The instigators of the genocide assumed that no trials would be 
instituted because of the vast number of suspects and expected a blanket amnesty. Initially the 
classical justice system proved incapable of coping with trials within a reasonable time frame for 
the 130 000 suspects clogging the prisons in a country of 26 326 km
2
 and 8 million inhabitants. 
Although transitional justice specialists suggested a Truth and Reconciliation commission, the 
Rwandan Government preferred something more educative and punitive. By turning from 
classical courts to the traditional system of Gacaca with its elements of reconciliation, 
punishment and the involvement of the populace, the Government was able to give the 
population a role in uncovering the crimes that happened in their villages, by telling the 
community at the Gacaca courts what they saw. It was necessary for there to be punitive 
sanctions in order to eradicate the culture of impunity which reigned between 1959 and 1994.  
This dissertation examined restorative and retributive justice systems in order to clarify and 
uncover the real nature of Gacaca courts which is a mixture of both with more elements of the 
retributive system.  
The dissertation also traces the origin of Gacaca courts through a historical background of 
Rwanda, a description of the Gacaca courts and their procedures, outlines the principles of 
restorative and retributive justice and compares each to Gacaca courts, in the process revealing 

















Section 1 Briefing 
From October 1990 to 1994, genocide was carried out in Rwanda by a government which 
identified itself as Hutu and which set out to exterminate the whole Tutsi ethnic minority in 
retaliation for Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) attacks from Uganda on the 1
st
 October 1990.  
Bagosora and other extremists of President Habyarimana Juvenal’s regime organised what they 
called an “apocalypse”, which eventually became concentrated into genocide against Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu. This resulted in the murder of more than a million Tutsi people. The RPF  
managed to stop the killings on 4
th
 July 1994 by defeating the Government army and 
Interahamwe militiamen, who fled towards the DR Congo (Zaire), forcing three million civilians 
to go with them. 
The RPF and moderate political parties then put in place a government called the Government of 
Transition to face all the challenges resulting from the aftermath of the genocide, including 
justice for the perpetrators and the survivors. Justice was carried out on three levels: 
a. an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
b. the domestic courts(Rwanda and elsewhere) 
c. the Gacaca courts.  
This thesis concentrates on the nature of the Gacaca courts in order to determine whether their  
aim was to achieve retributive or restorative justice. 
Section 2 Statement of the Issue of this Study 
Because the Gacaca courts system is so different from the formal system of justice - Phil Clark 
calls them “Justice without Lawyers”.
1
 This is a justice system which succeeded in trying more 
than one million people, a result impossible given the time-consuming court processes found in 
formal criminal system. 
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The Gacaca courts took their name from a traditional way of resolving conflicts which aimed at 
reconciling the disputing parties for the sake of maintaining a good relationship among the 
members of a village. It is noteworthy to recall here what Tom Bennett says: “the common-law 
system of criminal justice offends customary ideas of due process, which themselves may come 
closer to realising fundamental rights than the common law”
2
. To bear out this statement, the 
Gacaca courts finished the trials of more than 1.2 millions of accused persons and thus gave an 
answer to the saying that “justice delayed is a justice denied”.  
It must be recalled also that this new Gacaca took the official name ‘Gacaca courts’ in order to 
differentiate them from their traditional forebears. It should also be borne in mind that Gacaca 
courts were only created once the formal tribunals and the courts in Rwanda were found to be 
incapable of dealing with the vast number of genocide suspects, who had filled the prisons since 
1996. 
The idea of Gacaca courts came as a strong recommendation from what came to be known as the 
Urugwiro Village Presidential Reflection Meeting on different national issues. This reflection 
debate lasted from May 1998 to April 1999. The decision was finally taken that the best way to 
handle the problem of providing justice for the genocidaires would be to capitalise on grass roots 
participation. This was of importance because, unlike Nazi-Europe, where killings were carried 
out in secret in remote forest clearings or closely guarded camps, most of the killings in Rwanda 
were undertaken publicly in full view of the villagers. So it seemed reasonable to call upon the 
Rwandan population to bear witness to what they saw, and to give testimony to what happened 
during the genocide in 1994.  
The Gacaca court system, which uses lay judges, is heavily dependent on the participation of 
local communities. Foreign observers, noting the differences between Gacaca and the formal 
courts, started to describe them as examples of restorative justice
3
 because they seemed to have a 
reconciliatory mission. Gacaca courts, however, were different from Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions, such as that in South Africa, because of their power to pronounce a sentence on 
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  Tom W Bennett Customary Criminal Law in the South African Legal System” in J Fenrich, P Galizzi & T Higgins 
The Future of African Customary Law (2011) CUP 363-386. 
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 Lars Waldolf “Rwanda’s failing experiment in restorative justice” (2008) 422-434 in Handbook of Restorative 















the convicted suspects. As a result, others said that the aim of Gacaca courts was retributive
4
, 
because they believed that that restorative justice did not punish the offender but required 
reparation and an apology. 
The Gacaca courts tried the amazing number of 1,222,093 genocidaires
5
, who could be divided 
into the following categories: 
 1st Category: 15,263 (convicted 12,036 people;  3,227 acquittals) 
 2nd Category: 383,118 (convicted 267,404 people;  115,714 acquittals) 
 3rd Category: 838,975(convicted 809,434 people;  29,541 acquittals) 
 Total: 1,222,093 (convicted 1,088,874 people; 148, 482 acquittals) 
Section 3 Research Methodology 
Are Gacaca courts delivering retributive or restorative justice? As the writer of this thesis played 
a role in the establishment of the courts from the first conception of the idea that they should be 
used, he was naturally curious (partly because of his inside knowledge) about their real nature.  
Until October 2006 this writer was the Director of the Legal Unit of the National Service of 
Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. He participated in the Presidential meeting which decided to create 
Gacaca courts to replace the formal justice system in 1999.
6
 He continued to follow the 
development of the courts after leaving the National Service of Gacaca Courts in the Western 
Province. For this thesis he has drawn on his experience in the setting up and organisation of the  
courts as well as on his experience as a judge in formal Rwanda courts to compare the theories of 
restorative and retributive justice and to discuss the real nature of Gacaca courts.  The 
comparisons, principles and conclusions made in the study will be drawn from the theories of 
restorative justice and retributive justice applied to the specific situation of the Gacaca. 
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 Allison Corey and Sandra F Joireman “Retributive Justice: the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda” (2004) 103 in African 
Affairs at 73–89. 
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 Statistics of the National Service of Gacaca Courts in November 2011. 
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Section 4 Structure of the study 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first gives a general introduction by providing an 
outline to the topic. The second chapter reviews the historical background of Rwanda from its 
emergence as a state in the 11
th
 century through the colonial period, to the Hutu regime, which 
took power after the independence of the country in 1962 and ruled until it was overthrown after 
the genocide of Tutsi in 1994.  The third chapter gives a description of the Gacaca courts and 
their functioning.  The fourth chapter analyses the real nature of these courts through the 
concepts of restorative and retributive justice. The fifth chapter gives general conclusions to the 
study. 
Section 5 Aims and Objectives of the Study  
This study has two objectives. The first is to give readers and researchers a clearer analytical 
understanding of Gacaca courts; the second is to simplify the discussion on their nature. It has 
been noticed that researchers on Gacaca either start from the standpoint that they dispense 
restorative justice or that they dispense retributive justice or a combination of the two. By doing 
this, however, they raise unfounded and misleading issues, thereby interfering with the 
objectivity and usefulness of their findings. 
It is hoped that this analysis will facilitate further research on Gacaca courts by providing a better 
understanding of the process that will inspire possible applications of these courts in solving 
conflicts in other areas
7
. It is also hoped that this study will be of help in implementing a similar 
regime elsewhere. 
Section 6 Scope of the Study 
This study provides a contextual background to the creation of the Gacaca courts and their 
functioning. It also makes a comparative study of these courts and restorative justice, on the one 
hand, and retributive justice, on the other. The study is made possible by a comprehensive review 
of the literature on the theories of those two concepts of justice. 
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE GACACA COURTS 
Section 1 Introduction 
This chapter offers insight into the context out of which the Gacaca court system emerged as a 
solution to an overwhelmed justice system. It also explains how and why Rwandans turned away 
from the formal justice system (the so-called civil law, which was inherited from the Belgian era 
of colonization), and, for the trials of genocide, chose instead to adopt the Gacaca system. 
Chapter 1 explained the context from which Gacaca courts arose. This chapter seeks  to elucidate 
the complicated history and social situation into which Gacaca was born. 
After the genocide, which took place in 1994, Rwanda’s court system could not manage the 
volume of cases, taking into consideration the barbarism with which the crimes were committed. 
Sixty-six different kinds of killing and torture methods have been identified and these had to be 
taken into consideration in the judgments. The court system had few options: amnesty for all; 
dealing with the cases in the formal manner or proposing an alternative system. The alternative 
was Gacaca.  The backlog of cases had been noted as early as 1999. The Gacaca courts were 
introduced in June of 2002, after they had been presented to the international community. Few 
alternatives were offered to reduce the case-load in the formal justice system. 
The Gacaca courts are noticeably different from traditional formal justice systems applied in 
Western states. There was little international precedent - or understanding - of such a radically 
different approach to dealing with a major international crime.  As a result, lawyers and human 
rights activists became involved in extensive debate and scrutiny of the Gacaca system.
8
  
During the early phases the Gacaca courts were resisted fiercely by the survivors of the genocide. 
It was difficult to convince them that the Gacaca courts should replace the formal justice system. 
This reluctance was primarily because the Gacaca courts apply comparatively mild punishments 
to what were sometimes atrocious and brutal crimes committed during the genocide. Indeed the 
penal code penalties were more severe, and they were still applied to ordinary crimes. Because 
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the Gacaca courts would only give mild punishment to the genocide accused, it is difficult to 
convince people why these sentences for the very grave crimes were ‘soft” while, in the 
traditional court system, the punishment for ordinary crimes remained severe. Those standing 
trial for genocide were extremely suspicious of the light punishments. Many thought it was a 
ploy to trick them into pleading guilty, after which they would be sentenced to death.
9
  
The Gacaca system was not perfect. It had its own weaknesses, including being unable to address 
all questions – such as the giving of reparations - which are discussed later in this thesis under 
the human rights section. Notwithstanding the criticisms, the Gacaca courts stood for a form of 
justice, which is something that the planners of the genocide were confident could be evaded 
because of the sheer quantity of criminals that had been involved. This is significant: if justice 
were not seen to be done in Rwanda, a bad precedent would have been set for future genocides.
10
 
In this chapter I will develop four main points:  
- the first relates to the short history of Rwanda as the roots of the genocide can be found in 
the history of the country. 
- secondly, I will summarise how the Tutsi genocide happened, and how Gacaca came to 
be instituted as the means of judging the perpetrators suspected of being involved in this 
holocaust. This will help readers to understand why an amnesty was not appropriate.  
- thirdly, this thesis will show how the trials of suspects started within the formal criminal 
justice system, and how that by its very nature hindered the process.  
- finally, I will show how the idea of Gacaca came about and why. 
Section 2 Historical Background of Rwanda 
A. From Colonialism to the Independence of Rwanda  
Rwanda was a monarchy led by a King (Mwami), who since the 11
th
 century A D was a Tutsi. 
Unlike many countries in Africa, Rwanda has one language, namely, Kinyarwanda, which is 
spoken by all Rwandan citizens, and all share the same culture although with some local 
variations. Nonetheless, Rwanda has three so-called ethnic groups, namely, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, 
                                                 
9
 Penal Reform International Research report on Gacaca report VI (2004) 20. 
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all distributed in 18 clans. Within each clan all the three “ethnic”
11
 groups are found. Every 
Rwandan falls into one of these clans
12
. Technically Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are not ethnic groups 
but are rather socio-economic classes. As Ingelaere says: 
Hutu and Tutsi were originally not racial categories, but socio-economic classes. 
Abatutsi (in the plural) was the name given to wealthier persons possessing cattle. 
Poorer families, with only little or no land, and no cattle, were referred to as the 
Abahutu”. Mobility was possible. A family obtaining cattle became “tutsified”; those 
losing status were degraded into a situation of “hutuness.”
13
 
In traditional Rwanda there were both rich and poor Hutu and Tutsi and both communities had 
the same rights, which were less than the rights of the nobles and rich people. The only source of 
wealth was cattle. The cattle were available through working for the owner of the cattle after 
which the latter had a duty to give a cow to the workman. The umugaragu (worker) was paid a 
cow, which was an equivalent of a salary in a modern day contract of employment, by his 
shebuja (boss). This contract was called ubuhake is in many ways similar to a modern job 
contract. Once a worker was given a cow, it was known that that worker would get more cows. 
After getting more cows, a poor Hutu would then have the right of kwihutura, meaning changing 
his identity from Hutu to Tutsi.   
In 1885, the Berlin Conference rendered Rwanda a German Colony. German remained in control 
until its defeat in 1916 during the First World War (1914-1918). After the War, in 1919, the 
League of Nations placed Rwanda under a Belgian mandate which eventually was replaced by 
the United Nations Trusteeship system in 1946. That system lasted until independence in 1962. 
During this same period, Belgium was the colonial master of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). It treated Rwanda as a colony, and introduced extensive socio-political reforms. 
In 1931, Belgium introduced the ethnic identity card of Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. After Rwandan 
independence in 1962, this ethnic card allowed the Hutu government to discriminate against 
                                                 
11
 I should not use the term ethnic because Tutsi Hutu and Twa are actually not ethnic group but economic classes 
which are more permeable according to the wealth that one owns.  
12
 M d’Hertefelt Les clans du Rwanda ancient: elements d’ethnosociologie et d`ethnohistoire (1971) M.R.A.C 
Tervuren; Tharcisse GatwaThe churches and ethnic ideology in the Rwanda crises 1900-1994(2005)10-11. 
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Bert Ingelaere Traditional justice and reconciliation after violent conflict: learning from African experiences. The 
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Tutsi, which, during the genocide, played a critical role in enabling Hutu to identify Tutsi. 
(Indeed, the identity card system was similar to that of apartheid in South Africa.)
14
 
Talking about those reforms Shongwe has this to say: 
The period from 1926 to 1931 could be classified as the period of reforms brought 
about by the Belgians. For example, Rwanda became a centralized state, efficient, 
neo-traditionalist and a Catholic country. But it was also brutal. It was brutal because 
taxation and forced labour burdens were imposed on the native population. For 
example, people were forced to work in the construction of permanent structures, to 
grow compulsory crops and so on and so forth. It is argued that those who did not 




Also, in the traditional administrative organization in Rwanda, each village of the country was 
ruled through a division of labour, as there was a chief of cattle, a chief of land and an army chief 
in charge of security. The traditional authority was shared between Tutsi and Hutu except for the 
office of King, which was reserved for a Tutsi. A single chief could not have power over 
everything. In its reforms, Belgium abandoned the division of power between three chiefs and 
fused their positions into one. In addition, all Hutu chiefs were fired and replaced with Tutsi. The 
Belgian colonials installed the system of Tutsi rule, as they harboured an ideological 
misconception that the Tutsi were gifted leaders and rulers.
16
The misconception of Tutsi 
superiority was later endorsed by the abolition of kwihutura.
17
 Kwihutura means the conversion 
of a Hutu into a Tutsi, when he, for example, became rich by having cattle. Conversely, a Tutsi 
who became poor became a Hutu. If a man had more than 10 cows, he was a Tutsi, if he had less 
than 10 cows he was Hutu, and if he was a ceramicist or a hunter, a Twa. 
This ideological misconception of Tutsi superiority is one of the root causes of the Tutsi 
genocide in 1994. The Hutu community developed a kind of inferiority complex that the Tutsi 
were superior, and from this developed the idea that if the Tutsi perished, the Hutu would regain 
social and political power. 
                                                 
14
 The discrimination was not only in law but everywhere. At school and in the work there was a quota system and it 
was strictly forbidden to give Tutsi more than 10% of the places and because of that instruction not even 10% was 
reached. 
15
Shongwe From genocide to Gacaca: historical and socio-political dynamics of identity in the late twentieth 
century in Rwanda (the perspective of Durban based Rwandese) (2008) 185. 
16
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The colonial administrators created an education system that functioned in favour of the Tutsi 
and worked against the Hutu. The Belgians built a school exclusively for the children of Tutsi 
chiefs in order to groom them to become replacements for their fathers as chiefs.  In 1910, a 
policy was established with the aim of turning the Tutsi into the rulers of Rwanda. Schools were 
established not for sons of ordinary Tutsi but only for sons of Tutsi chiefs. Colonial 
administrators so ardently followed this program that schools were sometimes moved from an 
area if it were predominantly Hutu. This resulted in the formation of what in 1929 was called by 




The Belgians also introduced a system of forced labour, called “ubuletwa.”
19
 This system was 
detested by the Hutu, who were forced to labour under the supervision of Tutsi chiefs. Those 
who did not comply or perform were beaten. When the Tutsi chiefs were seen to have failed their 
duties, they were beaten publicly in front of the village. As the Belgian colonial rulers employed 
a process of indirect rule they were not seen as directly responsible for ubuletwa. Responsibility 
rested squarely on the shoulders of the Tutsi chiefs. A Rwandan elder, Kanamugire Joseph, who 
arguably understood ubuletwa, explained that it was in the interests of the people, as, for 
example, in the case of the famine of Gahoro (1940-1945), when the people were forced to 
cultivate crops and at the end of the day the entire harvest was given to the population. 
 
Violence against the Tutsi people has occurred many times over in Rwanda. In 1959, a widely 
spread, though unverified, report claimed that one, Mbonyumutwa Dominique, one of the few 
Hutu chiefs, had been killed by a young Tutsi. This led the Hutus to begin killing Tutsi and 
burning their properties.  This event was called the Hutu Revolution of 1959 in reference to the 
French Revolution of 1789. A hundred thousand Tutsi were killed, and many fled to the 
neighbouring countries. In a wave of events between 1959 and 1962, local Tutsi rulers were 
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Between 1961 and 1966 a group of refugee Tutsi fighters, called Inyenzi, attacked Rwanda from 
bases in Burundi and Uganda. Then President Grégoire Kayibanda used these attacks to fuel 
hatred of Tutsi both within and without Rwanda. Rachel Yeld argues that: 
[w]hile the question of repatriation of the 1960‘s Unarist refugees was still alive, 
and for the duration of the ten major inyenzi attacks into Rwanda between 1961 
and 1966, Kayibanda‘s government could externalise ethnic antagonism onto the 
Tutsi enemy without, although each attack triggered retaliatory violence against 
Tutsi still living in Rwanda.
21
 
A significant number of Batutsi were killed in reprisal attacks, and even more left the country as 
refugees. These attacks and the violent reactions of the Rwandan regime foreshadowed what was 
to happen 30 years later in the genocide. The descendants of these refugees would form the bulk 
and backbone of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army (RPA) that attacked Rwanda in October 1990, seeking an armed return to their country.
22
 
B. The Hutu Regime from 1961-1994 
On the 28
th
 January 1961 at Gitarama, the King Kigeri V Ndahindurwa was dethroned and 
forced into exile in Burundi. He eventually settled in the USA. Grégoire Kayibanda, a Muhutu, 
became the first President of Rwanda.
23
  
After gaining independence in 1962, the government pursued a campaign that entrenched the 
Hutu supremacy over Tutsi. Helped by the colonial powers, the government abolished the Tutsi 
kingdom, which could be traced back to the 11
th
 century. When the Rwanda was colonised in 
1897, the Tutsi Kingdom remained but with greatly diminished powers, as, with the rest of 
Africa, the colonisers had the real power during the colonial period. 
The Hutu people were taught in school that the 1959 Revolution freed the Hutu from the 
oppression of Tutsi. Since Independence and the installation of the Hutu leaders the idea that the 
Tutsi could return to power affronted the Hutu people. The Hutu acted very harshly against Tutsi 
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The Rwandan refugees outside Rwanda, living in exile in neighbouring countries, were desperate 
to return home. Inside Rwanda, the Tutsi people had been relegated to the position of second 
class citizens; they were denied the right to education, the right to public work, freedom of 
expression, and many other basic human rights. They were permitted to vote, but were not 
permitted to stand for office. The discrimination against the Tutsi extended to civil society and to 
the youth, who frequently insulted and belittled their Tutsi counterparts
25
.  
During the Hutu regime, especially among the youth and intellectuals, great energy was spent 
convincing the Tutsi that they were inferior to Hutu, and did not deserve any right, not even the 
right to live. Unfortunately, some Tutsi became convinced that they did not even have the right 
to defend themselves. Several testimonies given during the mourning weeks in commemoration 
of genocide (between April and July  of every year) reveal that many Tutsi were ready to be 
killed without  any  attempt to self-defence or to even buy quick death with  a bullet.
26
 
Since coming to power the Hutu regime had cultivated a society where it was acceptable for 
civilians to kill Tutsi people in order to reduce their numbers. This was done without any legal 
consequences for those involved. The killers consisted of ordinary civilians, supervised by the 
army, who was there to assist in the event of any resistance by the Tutsi. The Hutu civilians came 
to believe that killing a Tutsi was not a crime, as they knew they would not receive any 
punishment, a situation that created great fear among Tutsi living inside Rwanda, which, in turn, 
facilitated the killing in 1994.
27
  
This series of events led the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to launch its attack against the 
Rwandese Army Forces (FAR) on 1
st
 October 1990. The RPF was made up of Rwandan refugees 
who had been denied the right to return to Rwanda by the Hutu regime. The Hutu leaders 
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claimed that the country was too small to receive more Rwandan people. This was the first time 
that the media talked about the RPF and its armed wing, Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA).  
Some have argued that the invasion by the RPF provoked the genocide, and it was, indeed, a 
clear tipping point, although Rwanda had been slowly moving towards this point since the late 
1950s. The Tutsi in Rwanda had been harassed and killed by the Hutu regime since the 
Revolution of 1959. 
Section 2 Genocide against Tutsi of 1994 
A. The reaction of the Hutu government to the attack by RPF on 1
st
 October 1990 
From the 1
st
of October 1990, the Hutu regime of Rwanda started to show how risky it would be 
for Tutsi people - and for the Hutu people in the opposition - to live within Rwanda. On the 5
th
 
October 1990 the government arrested more than 5000 innocent people at Kigali, falsely 
accusing them of collaborating with the enemy (RPF) that was stationed 300 km from Kigali. 
Many Tutsi and a few Hutu from the opposition were brought to the stadium of Nyamirambo. 
Some of the people died during the ordeal because of the brutality with which they were handled, 
others were executed in the stadium by army. 
Larissa Van den Herik wrote the following about this date:  
[initially] the RPF invasion was quite successful. So much so, that the Rwandan 
government found it necessary to fake an attack on Kigali in the night of 04 October 
1990.This manoeuvre served two purposes. Firstly, it was used as a pretext to arrest 
thousands of presumed opponents, and secondly it was aimed at acquiring foreign 
military aid. At Rwanda`s request, France sent substantial military aid, some 600 
troops Belgium and Zaire also offered some support.
28
 
President Habyarimana’s government engaged in an extensive propaganda campaign.
29
 
 It accused the RPF of aiming to restore the monarchy with its forced labour and servitude. It 
espoused a version of Rwandan history whereby the Tutsi people were seen as alien, foreigners, 
while Hutu were viewed as genuine Rwandans. The Hutu ideology was intended to mobilise all 
Hutu together around three main ideas about the Bahutu: 
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1. they were numerically the majority; 
2. they arrived in Rwanda before the Tutsi;  and 
3. they had been oppressed by the Tutsi monarchy during the past. 
That the Bahutu were in the majority was true, the other two points were propaganda.  
After the invasion of RPF the Rwandan government used this Hutu ideology to mobilise its 
citizens and the international community with the aim of getting military support. Inside the 
country, they cultivated hatred against Tutsi and, using the Interahamwe, conducted organised 
massacres in rural areas (such as Bugesera, Kibilira and Kibuye) where the Tutsi were in the 
majority. 
B.  Preparation of the Genocide against Tutsi 
In 1991, after a meeting between France and certain African leaders, held in La Baule in France 
under the auspices of French Government, President Habyarimana Juvenal allowed the creation 
of many political parties. The following were the new parties created: the Movement 
Démocratique Rwandais (MDR), Parti Liberal (PL), Parti Social Démocratique (PSD), Parti 
Démocratique Chrétien (PDC) and Parti Démocratique Islamique (PDI).  President Habyarimana 
was expecting to get allies against RPF from amongst these parties, but many allied themselves 
with the RPF instead with the aim of getting rid of President Habyarimana.
30
 
There were stirrings of democracy emerging in Rwanda. The RPF was gaining support not only 
from Tutsi, but also from a large number of Hutu. As criticism of the government grew, the 
regime’s fear of both the Tutsi people and opposition parties was exacerbated as was the hatred 
against them. The Hutu leaders aimed to quell this opposition before it could gain further 
momentum. Anything that could reduce the power of the enemy was welcomed. The government 
used bribes as well as political assassinations: Mugenzi Justin, President of the Liberal Party, 
was bribed. Gatabazi, President of Parti Social Démocratique, and Gapyisi, a politician were 
murdered. Many others were threatened.
31
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The regime realised that many Bahutu were joining the opposition and almost all were allies of 
the RPF. Because of this they started to market to the Hutu an ideology based on Hutu unity 
against Tutsi. They introduced a newspaper called Kangura which published inflammatory 
articles by Hutu extremists such as Bagosora Theoneste
32
, Ndindiliyimana Anatole Nsengiyumva 
Tharcisse Renzaho and others .This led to the publication of the “Hutu Ten Commandments”, as 
described by Mamdani.
33
 These aimed to demonizing the best characteristics of the Tutsi, and 
warned the Hutu to avoid them (especially Tutsi women recognized to be beautiful where 
commandment no 1 says: “As a result we shall consider a traitor any Muhutu who marries a 
Mututsi woman, makes a Mututsi woman his concubine, employs a Mututsi woman as a 
secretary or makes her his dependant). 
These Ten Hutu Commandments were published and repeated often, to ensure that every Hutu 
unequivocally accepted them. After that, the situation of Tutsi deteriorated considerably. Larissa 
J Van den Herik describes the situation as follows: 
As a more general response to the RPF invasion, Habyarimana (President) resorted to 
the well-known tactics of retaliation against the Tutsi in Rwanda itself. In the media 
case, the expert witness Des Forges named 17 major attacks against Tutsi during the 
years preceding the genocide. As an expert witness in the case of Rutaganda, Reyntjens 
had also indicated that ethnic massacres had taken place as preludes to the genocide in 
the years: 1990-1994. In this respect, he referred to the speech of Leon Mugesera in 
March 1992 as a very clear and direct incitement to commit genocide. Relying in 
addition on the testimony of expert witness Des Forges, the Trial Chamber noted in its 
judgment in the media case that from 1991 there was a tendency to picture all Tutsi as 
the enemy, as evidenced, inter alia, by a secret military report on “ how to defeat the 
enemy in the military ,media and political domains. The Akayezu judgment had also 
pointed out that radio station Radio et Television Libres des Milles Collines (RTLM) 




Alongside the anti-Tutsi propaganda, preparations proceeded for mass killings. A large number 
of weapons, machetes, grenades, guns and axes, were purchased and distributed. The formation 
and training of Interahamwe units was part of this process. Interahamwe is a Kinyarwanda 
meaning "those who stand/work/fight/attack together". It was a Hutu paramilitary organization, 
which was trained at military facilities such as Gabiro, Gako, Bigogwe and Kanombe. According 
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to reports, French commanders were amongst the instructors.
35
 Some Interahamwe went for 




Kangura and RTLM continued to broadcast hate speech and propaganda stating that Tutsi had to 
be exterminated, as well as any Hutu who supported the RPF or who criticized the regime and 
were therefore the accomplices of Inyenzi (the name given to RPF and Tutsi which means 
cockroaches). This hate speech was taught and produced by extremist Hutu who claimed that the 
RPF invasion aimed at restoring ‘slavery of the Hutu people” and at ending the social benefits 
that were a result of the 1959 Social Revolution, through which the Hutu had taken power from 
the Tutsi King. The propagandists warned Hutu to stand and fight all enemies, and that the 
enemies were in their circles. Further, they stated that the enemy was not only the RPF, which 
was fighting in the North of the country between Rwanda and Uganda, but also the Tutsi people 
who were living among them. All Tutsi were assumed to be guilty of supporting the RPF, 
because almost the majority of refugees who had joined the RPF were Tutsi.
37
  
In August 1992 RPF and Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) engaged in peace talks at Arusha 
in Tanzania. The result was the Arusha Agreement, signed on 4
th
August 1993, to cease 
hostilities. This Peace accord included power sharing between MRND, RPF and seven 




A new extremist party emerged, called CDR (Coalition pour la Démocratique  au Rwanda), 
created by the Hutu regime, which was excluded from the power sharing because of its Nazi-like 
hate speech. This party started to denigrate the Arusha Agreement, warning against its 
implementation. The CDR was in actual fact the mouthpiece of the ruling party MRND, its 
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The first step in the implementation of the Arusha Agreement was the swearing in of the Peace 
Government under the supervision of President of the Republic of Rwanda, Habyarimana, who 
in fact did not want to do it. His political family MRND and the Akazu agreed among to 
sabotage the Arusha Peace Agreement.
40
 Habyarimana was however under divergent pressures: 
an internal pressure from his political family, forbidding him from implementing the Arusha 
Agreement, and an external pressure from the international community and from the internal 
opposition forcing him to implement it. Habyarimana did not know what to do. He had clearly 
lost power.
41
 Some analysts said that the extremists decided to kill him when he was about to 




On the evening of his return from Arusha in Tanzania, his jet was fired on by a missile. The jet 
crashed, and all of the occupants were killed. Among them was President Cyprian Ntaryamira of 
Burundi. At 8h30 pm on 6
th
 April 1994, RTLM declared that President Habyarimana had been 
killed. RTLM stated that this was done by Belgian peacekeepers to help the RPF. 
 
On the same night, the Presidential guards started killing the opposition leaders and Batutsi in 
Kigali. The shooting down of the Presidential plane was the catalyst that started the genocide on 
a large scale, but the plan had been in existence since the 1992, after the RPF attack.
43
 The Hutu 
extremist newspaper Kangura had predicted in January 1994 that the President was going to be 
killed by the end of March 1994,
44
 And he was indeed killed, although a week later than the 
prediction. This is one of the reasons leading to the assumption that President Habyarimana was 
killed by members of his own political family to avoid the implementation of the Arusha 
agreement.  
 
Bagosora told Dallaire: “For Rwanda to enjoy even one day of peace it was necessary “to 
exterminate the Tutsi”
45
.After the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane, the presidential guard 
and the Interahamwe started killing Tutsi and RPF supporters. The civilian population did not 
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react spontaneously: rather, the authorities encouraged Hutu people to avenge the President’s 




Four things played in favour of the genocide:  
1) the 1959 revolution which placed Hutu in power and kept them in fear of losing it;  
2) the attack by RPF which was vocal about its opposition to the dictatorship of the 
regime.  
3) the Arusha Peace Agreement which reduced the power of the President and extremist 
Bahutu.  
4) external help from France. 
There is overwhelming evidence that the genocide was planned, and that the government 
prepared for it. The first factor was the training of Interahamwe. The second was the propaganda 
to create hatred of Tutsi using media such as the RTLM and Kangura. The third was the 
distribution of fire arms and machetes among militia and civil defence. The fourth was the 
creation of fear among the prospective victims, the Tutsi and opposition, by harassing and killing 
some and making frequent attacks in the areas where many Tutsi lived. The genocide was far 
from being a spontaneous reaction to the killing of the President. After training, Interahamwe 
had been deployed in areas known to have many Tutsi, and they started to kill the Tutsi with the 




In fact, significant lessons were drawn from Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler’s infamous text. The book 
was translated into Kinyarwanda by a German Priest, Father Johan Pristil,
48
 a lecturer at the 
Grand Seminary of Nyakibanda in Rwanda. The mass involvement of killers rather than a small 
group to make prosecution more difficult was an inference from Hitler`s book, and the history of 
the aftermath of the Jewish Holocaust. Another lesson was to gather together all the Tutsi in one 
place to make it easier to kill them. Indeed, this happened at all points of killings and the modus 
operandi was the same throughout the country. Tutsi were told to go to church buildings, school 
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buildings and stadia to “get protection from the gendarmerie”. After they had gathered, the 
gendarmerie would call in the Interahamwe who would then massacre them.  
 
In the beginning killings were committed by the army, the gendarmerie and the Interahamwe. 
Soon, however, villagers became involved, killing Tutsi, in what was called the “civil defence”
49
.   
 
In 1994 the interim Government of Rwanda was operating on two fronts. It was engaged in 
genocide in the centre of the country, as well as a war against the RPF in the North. On the one 
hand, the political and administrative organisation inside the country oversaw and orchestrated 
the genocide; on the other hand, it conducted the war against the RPF.  
 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the Rwandan Government F rces (RGF) and ended the 
genocide. The general systematic genocide, however, continued from the 6
th
 of April 1994 until 
the 4
th
 of July 1994. During this period, more than a million Tutsi were killed, infrastructure was 
destroyed and property was looted by the defeated government and Interahamwe officers. The 
country was left in a dysfunctional state, with no electricity, no water, no food, no hospitals and 
no people on the streets except the army of the RPF.
50
  
After two weeks, on 19th July 1994, a new government based on the Arusha Peace Agreement 
was installed. Its President was a Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, a member of RPF. The Vice-
President was Major General Paul Kagame.  
Section 3 Ensuring justice for suspects of genocide after 1994 (Formal justice) 
 
The reason for ensuring justice for suspects of genocide has been particularly described in an 
article by Jeremy Sarkin: 
[d]oes a society need an official account and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the 
past? How can the victims of human rights violations be assisted in some way and 
have their dignity restored?  Knowing about the abuses of the past and acknowledging 
them seems to be the crucial issue in a transitional process.  Ignoring history leads to 
collective amnesia, which is not only unhealthy for the body politic, but is essentially 
an illusion—an unresolved past will inevitably return to haunt the citizens. The 
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establishment of a full official account of the past is increasingly seen as an important 




To these questions the Government of Rwanda answered yes, and to its credit it decided to 
ensure that the crimes of the past would be brought into the open and the perpetrators punished. 
But it had serious problems in implementing such justice. All the courts lacked infrastructure and 
personnel. Before the genocide started on 6 April 1994, there were 850 judges but only 44 
among them had a law degree. The Rwanda Prosecution had hired 70 prosecutors in total, only 
22 of whom had a law degree.  
After the genocide, court buildings had been destroyed by the genocidaires. Of the 850 judges, 
only 195 remained and, of the 70 prosecutors, only 12. The first task for the judicial system after 
the genocide was to train judges, prosecutors and supporting staff. The courts started with civil 
cases and common crimes. They could not deal with genocide-related cases with as there were 
no existing laws to deal with the matter.  
Some jurists thought that the penal code could apply to genocide cases but that would have 
caused problems relating to prescription. Another issue was the principle of non-retroactivity of 
the criminal laws according to the principle o  ‘nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege’.
52
 If 
parliament were to enact a new law to punish the genocide committed before in 1994, lawyers 
were agreed that it would have to be in accordance with Article 15(2) of the UN Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights
53
 of 16 December 1966.
54
 
It was accepted, however, that in all cases of crimes against humanity, as in Rwanda, the law 
could bear a retroactive force, i.e., it could apply to crimes committed before it was enacted.
55
 
Thus, on the 30th August 1996, the Parliament of Rwanda enacted a law to punish the 
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perpetrators of the genocide committed in 1994. It appeared as an Organic Law no 08/96 of 30 
August 1996, and provided for the prosecution of crimes of genocide and crimes of war and 
crimes against humanity committed between 1st October 1990 and 31st December 1994. This 
Organic Law referred to the penal code for the penalties and to the International Conventions 
that Rwanda had adopted.
56
 
The first genocide trial took place on 27 December 1996 at Kibungo, Eastern Province in the 
Bizimana and Gatanazi Egide case.
57
 Since then the trials of genocidaires continued to be heard 
in the 13 tribunals of First Instance within Rwanda on a regular basis, but, compared to the large 
numbers of people awaiting trial, the outcome was minimal. The government held evaluative 
talks in the President’s office from May 1998 to March 1999, and from this emerged a request to 




Section 4 Backlog in the Formal Courts and the Gacaca Idea 
A. The Backlog in the Courts 
In 1996 there were only 13 courts competent to genocide crimes in Rwanda, and there were 132 
000 people awaiting trial in the prisons. The courts were only able to deliver about 1000 
judgements per year. By 2001, in 5 years, all these tribunals had made rulings in cases for a mere 
6 000 people. Therefore, as the total number of prisoners was 132 000, the caseload was 126 000 
people awaiting judgment; among them some had been detained and awaiting trial for seven 
years. At that rate it would have taken 132 years to conclude the entire caseload, and more than 
70% would have died in prison without trial. The figures above relate only to the number of 
people imprisoned for committing violence during the genocide. In fact, as shown during the 
Gacaca courts disclosures, the actual number of suspects was over one million people. 
Considering that figure, it would have taken more than one thousand years to finish the backlog 
of genocide cases using the formal court system.
59
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Even with the highest levels of energy, passion and dedication the courts could not handle the 
enormous backlog. Ordinary procedures were incapable of handling the volume and nature of the 
cases. It must be borne in mind that the genocide master plan had intended to involve a large 
number of Hutu in order to paralyse the capacity of the prosecution.  This led to the use of a 




The prisons were overcrowded to such an extent that people accused of theft or petty crimes 
were released after arrest, because of a lack of space. This overcrowding led to an escalation of 
criminal acts, because the threat of prison was no longer a deterrent. The overcrowded prisons 
and the overburdened justice system led to concerns about justice and human rights, such as 
delayed justice, the impunity given to petty criminals, mistreatment of prisoners and lack of basic 
living standards due to overcrowding, etc.
61
 
Early in 1999, the Gacaca courts system was suggested as an option to deal with the case 
backlog. First it was discussed in an ad hoc commission, then at a ministerial meeting and later at 
provincial, district and international levels. The idea was debated publicly in every district of the 
country, as well as at an international colloquium, with the aim of getting new ideas to resolve 
the issues of justice and reconciliation.
62
 
B. The idea of Gacaca 
The government held a series of talks in the President’s office. Present at these meetings were 
the Rwandan elite, including the President, Pasteur Bizimungu, and the Vice-President, Paul 
Kagame, as well as senior ministers, the President of Commission in Parliament, the presidents 
of various political parties, retired political leaders, politicians who served before independence 
who were still alive, politicians of the former regime who were still alive, the prefect of 
prefectures, as well as the Presidents of the various Courts in Rwanda. The Presidents of the 
Tribunals of First Instance were present when the discussion was on justice and the prosecutors 
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in chief at all levels. As the writer of this thesis was the president of one of the 13 tribunals, he 
was also in attendance. They were held on Saturdays.
63
 
The three main expectations of any solution were:  
- acceleration of the trials 
- eradication of impunity, i.e. the meting out of justice, and 
- the aiding of reconciliation through truth and justice.64 
There appeared to be no easy solution to the genocide trials. The 13 tribunals were clearly too 
few to try all 126 000 cases in a reasonable time. Creating separate tribunals was not an option as 
this would have been resource intensive, requiring judges and personnel to serve. The idea of 
inviting international foreign judges was proposed, but that would have required translators and 
legal fees far beyond the capacity of the Rwanda or its donor funders. 
Because of the atrocities and cruelty that had been perpetrated over the three-month period – not 
to mention that had occurred previously in 1959, 1963, 1973 and 1994 - the idea of amnesty was 
considered inappropriate. Furthermore, although the law provided for a death penalty, the 
country was not prepared to put several hundred thousand people to death. 
The people who supported the idea of Gacaca wanted the participation of every Rwandan who 
had witnessed the killings and other crimes so that the truth could be exposed. The exposure of 
the truth was very important. If the courts could involve many people to bear witness to the truth 
of what they saw, this would accelerate the process of determining criminal responsibility rather 
than confining that task to one court with many rules and time consuming procedures.
65
 
To summarise this chapter: we have considered the history of Rwanda, as it led up to the 
genocide in 1994, the reason for the introduction of Gacaca, primarily the need to address the 
large number of suspects accused of genocide and the incapacity of the formal courts to process 
these cases at an acceptable speed. The next chapter will give a detailed description of the 
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Gacaca to illustrate the difference between them and the ordinary courts, showing their strengths 
















DESCRIPTION OF GACACA COURTS 
Section 1 Traditional Gacaca 
A.  Etymology 
In Kinyarwanda, the word Gacaca is the name of a short thick grass. Rwandans would 
traditionally sit on mats made of this grass, protected from sand and dirt, when talking or 
handling disagreements between neighbours. These disagreements could take the form of family 
disputes, fighting, theft or adultery, but not serious issues like murder. The tribunal was 
composed of a small group of men, usually close neighbours.  Women and teenagers were 
entitled to sit in the audience and give comments or testimonies. The objective of the Gacaca 
meeting was to reconcile the two parties in conflict. Failure to co-operate with the meeting would 
lead to being ostracised from the community. 
Alain Erin Tiemessen believes that: 
[i]n its pre-colonial form, Gacaca was used to moderate disputes concerning land use and 
rights, cattle, marriage, inheritance rights, loans, damage to properties caused by one of the 
parties or animals, and petty theft. .... Additionally, compensation could be awarded to the 
injured party. Gacaca occurred at a meeting that was convened by elders whenever there was 
a dispute between individuals or families in a community and was settled only with the 
agreement of all parties. The Government of Rwanda does not pretend that Gacaca today 
strictly adheres to its indigenous form. Officials argue that its reinvention takes the form that 
it does to better accommodate for the severity of the crimes in its mandate and the volume of 
cases to be tried.
66
 
 B. Some principles of traditional Gacaca 
Gacaca settled issues using customary law. Because these tribunals were voluntary, no one was 
forced to respond to an invitation to attend, but there was a moral obligation to comply. The 
underlying principle was to maintain the social cohesion required in a small, close community by 
ensuring that behaviour conformed to the accepted standards of social norms.  From a study done 
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on the Trobriand Islanders, Malinowski describes this kind of attitude in close communities 
where “each member was bound to others in a complex of reciprocal economic obligations in 




Based on this concept any neutral observer can see in the traditional Gacaca the following eight 
principles: 
1.  In Rwanda, people had to accept for themselves and for their family the social norms required 
to live peaceably together with others in the community. One who could not behave normally 
was criticised and could become the subject of stories (village gossip about his behaviour). The 
fear of being subject to gossip also existed in other traditional African societies and acted as a 
social sanction encouraging people to adopt more acceptable ways of behaving, as described by 
Simon Robert: ‘each will know that the attitude of others towards him will depend on his 




2.  Secondly, maintaining harmony in the community was very important because neighbours 
relied on each other in times of need, and particularly for life-cycle events, like marriage, 
initiation of children and funeral rites, and for keeping a watchful eye over one another’s wealth 
and kin. 
3.      Thirdly, reconciliation between the parties in conflict was necessary to ensure that harmony 
and good neighbourliness prevailed in the community. 
4.      The witnesses had to state the truth in order to avoid undermining the process of 
reconciliation. Lying and bias were strongly discouraged because this could jeopardise 
relationships, reflected by the Kinyarwanda expression “gushaka guteranya”, literally meaning 
“wanting to divide”.  
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5.      To achieve such reconciliation the judicial process and its sentence needed be seen to be 
fair. Fairness of the Gacaca trial involved providing reparation to the victim by the offending 
party.  
6.      In addition to reparation, the offending party also had to pay a fine to the court.  
7.      As the aim of Gacaca was to rebuild a good relationship between parties involved in the 
conflict it was the duty of everybody to help them reconcile. Where the offending party was 
unable to pay the total reparation ordered, the others villagers helped him/her to fulfil the Gacaca 
ruling.  
8.      Reconciliation was the cornerstone and the main objective of Gacaca.  
One Rwandan proverb provides that ahari abagabo ntihapfa abandi [where there are men no 
others can be sacrificed]. This proverb was the driving force behind convincing people to 
participate in the process of reconciliation so that witnesses would be invited to play a positive 
role in telling the truth so that the final trial could be fair.  
The enormity of the genocide meant that harsh prison sentences were less important than truth 
and reconciliation. In fact, these two principles - truth and the underlying need for reconciliation 
- were what attracted Rwandans to the idea of the Gacaca system. Traditional Gacaca combined 
litigation and reconciliation processes, and were different from other forms of dispute resolution 
process, such as mediation, arbitration or negotiation, which are voluntarily decided between 
parties. Unlike these processes the traditional Gacaca summoned the offender to appear before it 
and other members of the community. The procedure was not led by a chosen mediator, 
facilitator or arbitrator. It was a group of elders of the community and its members who 
convened to hear the case and to participate in adjudicating and reconciling the parties.
69
   
 C. Gacaca during colonisation                   
Before the colonial period traditional Gacaca was used for all matters of justice, but during the 
colonial period it was replaced in some areas with formal courts, established by the Belgian 
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government and gradually imposed upon Rwandans. During this time there was a dualism of 
justice: Gacaca were allowed in rural areas and modern courts for what were called les évolués
70
 
or “civilized Rwandese people”, white people and others foreigners living in Rwanda (such as 
Arabs and Indians). Major crimes were dealt with by colonial prosecutors and Gacaca only 
applied to civil matters or minor delicts in rural areas.
71
 
After independence on 1
st
 July 1962, customary law was down-played and only modern courts 
were considered competent to deliver justice. Nevertheless, Gacaca survived informally and 
Rwandans continued to use it to settle conflicts among neighbours. Rather than going to the 
courts, they tried to sort the problem out between themselves, helped by their friends and elders. 
In contemporary Rwanda, this remains true. Rwandans first consider using Gacaca to settle their 
problems before turning to modern courts.  
 Section 2 Use of Gacaca Courts to Deal with Crimes Committed During the Genocide of 
Tutsi in 1994. 
A. The Choice of Gacaca Courts in Lieu of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
After the genocide, once the new Government of Rwanda was established on the 19 July 1994, it 
had many problems to deal with, primarily, providing justice for the survivors and dealing justly 
with the many suspects in prison.  
Was justice possible, and if so, what kind of justice was needed to handle the enormous number 
of suspects and injured survivors? 
The first trial in the formal justice system was held in Kibungo on 27
th
 December 1996 after 
almost three years of preparation. It has already been explained that this formal justice process 
was too slow and cumbersome to handle the genocide cases within an acceptable timeframe. As 
a result, the Government organised talks at the Presidential office in 1998. Four years had 
elapsed since the genocide of the Tutsi and it was necessary to obtain a common understanding 
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of its aftermath. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as had been established in 
South Africa, was not mentioned in public or in government circles, probably because of the 
gravity, inhumanity and repetition of the acts of genocide (that had become a “modus vivendi” of 
the Hutu regime from 1959 till 1994). Indeed, innocent Tutsi people had been killed in 1959, 
1963, 1964, 1973 and 1994 without anyone being tried. All the killers were set free without 
punishment; some were even thanked for the zeal they had demonstrated in killing Tutsi and 
were rewarded with a promotion or a good position. The only steps the government had taken 
after those killings had been the initiation of amnesty laws for the perpetrators
72
. In 1993, 
Bagosora, the mastermind of the genocide, had even promised at the Arusha peace talks in 
Tanzania that there would be an end of the Tutsi in what he called an “apocalypse.”
73
 
In fact, in the three months of 1994 from 6th April to July, the Interahamwe, the army and the 
population did try to bring about an end to the Tutsi by hunting and killing them. Because of the 
already existing climate of accepting and even rewarding the murderers, a commission of truth 
and reconciliation would not provide the killers with an understanding of the wrongfulness of 
their deeds. Nevertheless, some researchers suggested a Commission of Truth and Reconciliation 
in Rwanda rather than Gacaca
74
. But, it was necessary to change the culture and the belief that it 
was acceptable to kill Tutsi. For instance, killers who had as children witnessed their fathers 
killing Tutsi without any consequences would not expect to be punished when they were old 
enough to do the same. If no justice was seen to be done after the horrors of 1994, it would have 
been difficult for future generations of Hutu to understand that killing Tutsi was punishable.  
The genocide was deliberately perpetrated by the government, and, after the event many 
criminals were still living in the country alongside survivors. Sometimes the killers continued to 
kill as they were scared that the survivors would testify against them. There were also survivors 
who wanted to avenge the killing of their families but they could not do so because the 
government had guaranteed everybody’s security. Most survivors believed that they should wait 
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for justice as one side, whereas the other side of the Rwandans some suggested amnesty as it had 
been the case in the past with the other pogroms of Tutsi.
75
  
In December 1996 the Government instituted its first case against a Genocide suspect. In 1998, 
the Butare First Instance Tribunal in its ‘specialised chamber in charge of genocide trials” 
decided to hold an itinerant session in a town called Gikonko in Butare. The author of this thesis 
was the President of the Butare First Instance Tribunal. Once the court had started hearing 
witnesses, the villagers who were following the case expressed their desire to testify in the case. 
The judges allowed them to do so. They disclosed how the killings had been committed. Their 
testimony contradicted the evidence in the dossier provided by some of the officially called 
witnesses. This encouraged the Tribunal to allow the audience to say what they had witnessed. 
Because the genocide had taken place during the day, the villagers had watched. As nothing was 
hidden, almost all civilians had witnessed the event.
76
  
A large number of witnesses provided extensive evidence. The result was a strengthened case, 
and a more effective delivery of justice to the perpetrators of the genocide. It was clear that the 
memory and concepts of ancient Gacaca had not vanished from the minds of Rwandans.  
Members at the Presidential talks held between 1998 and 1999 were attracted to this ancient 
institution as a way of allowing the population to give evidence so that they would then have the 
opportunity to testify to what they had witnessed. Eventually, an ad hoc commission was set up 
to study whether it would be possible to use the Gacaca and how it would be possible to give it 
competence to try the genocide suspects.
77
 
B. Gacaca courts become effective. 
No law degree is needed to qualify to be a Gacaca judge. Even an illiterate person who fills the 
preconditions of integrity may be elected to a Gacaca court. Only the Presidents and Vice- 
Presidents of the Gacaca courts and their secretaries are required to be literate
78
. Gacaca courts 
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are led by judges who have been elected by the population because they are seen to have 
integrity and wisdom.  
Often the judges are unaware of who the witnesses will be before a case starts; people choose to 
give evidence during gatherings and stand up to do so. There are no prosecutors or investigators. 
That role is fulfilled by the audience during the work of the courts. The public plays a pivotal 
role, being the prosecution and the witnesses in accusing or discharging the suspects using the 
testimonies given. In Gacaca the words “prosecutors”, “investigators” and the “lawyers” are 
unknown. There are only judges, victims, suspects, witnesses and the public.  
The characteristics of the Gacaca courts as described above emanate from organic law No 
40/2000 of 26/01/2001, which describes the setting up “Gacaca jurisdictions” and organising 
prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity 
committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 
The preamble of the above law states as follows:   
[t]he preamble of the above law states as follows: considering that such offences were 
publicly committed before the very eyes of the population, which thus must recount 
the facts, disclose the truth and participate in prosecuting and trying the alleged 
perpetrators; Considering that the dut  to testify is a moral obligation, nobody having 
the right to get out of it for whatever reason it may be. 
The “Gacaca Jurisdictions” Department of the Supreme Court is in charge of control, 
inspection and Coordination of “Gacaca Jurisdictions” activities at the national level. This 
department has played a major role in designing a Gacaca court procedure, and has been 
helped by the Avocats sans Frontières Belgique [Lawyers Without Borders of Belgium]. 
With the constitution of 4 June 2003, this department of Gacaca jurisdictions was given 
autonomy and took the name of National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions. It had oversight 
of the bulk of Gacaca courts amounting to 12 103.
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The Gacaca can deliver indictments to arrest suspects where it seems to be relevant to do so and 
this can be done before or after judgment. 
81
 
Article 85 of Gacaca organic law, voted in 2004, provided for appeal from the Gacaca court of 
the sector. 
Suspects who pleaded guilty could expect substantial reductions in sentence. Even after the 
punishment as reduced it was converted into imprisonment for half of the sentence and 
community work for the rest. This leniency helped to reveal truth.
82
  
C. The Gacaca courts process  
This chapter develops five points, namely: (i) the replacement of formal criminal justice by the 
Gacaca court process, (ii) the internal organisation of Gacaca courts, (iii) their procedure, (iv) the 
penalties and TIG (Travaux d`Intérêt Général) and (v) the reconciliation achieved by the Gacaca 
courts. Following these five points, there is a discussion of criticisms of Gacaca.  
i. The replacement of formal criminal justice by the Gacaca courts process 
Organic Law No 08/96 of August 30, 1996 on the Organisation of Prosecutions for Offences 
constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since October 1, 
1990 was the first time Rwanda had enacted a law to punish the genocide. According to this law 
the suspects of genocide or crimes against humanity were to be prosecuted if the crimes they 
committed were punished by the penal code of Rwanda of 1977. 
This law put suspects into four categories according to the role they had played in the crimes.  
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Category 1 was for planners, supervisors, instigators, sexual violence and the notorious 
murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, 
distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed; 
Category 2 was for persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation placed 
them among perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious 
assault against the person causing death; 
Category 3 was for persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation made 
them guilty of other serious assaults against the person;  
Category 4 was for persons who committed offences against property. For this category the 
suspects were condemned to pay compensation only. They were amnestied for penalties. 
The law provided a special chamber in each tribunal amongst the 13 tribunals of first instance in 
the country. In each case, the procedure was the same: the suspects had the right to be assisted by 
lawyers of their choice at their own cost. Fortunately one NGO, ASF Belgique [Lawyers without 
Borders]) offered to pay for their lawyers.  
The first genocide trial started in December 1996
83
, and it continued in other prefectures of 
Rwanda. In 2001, when Gacaca courts were created, all the tribunals together had managed to try 
only 6 000 suspects in five years. That meant that in five years only about 4% of the prisoners 
had been tried.  
On the 15 March 2001 the Gacaca law was published. It provided for a department in charge of 
supervision, inspection and co-ordination of the Gacaca courts. With this law Gacaca became a 
chamber of the Supreme Court. That department was called the 6
th
 Chamber of the Supreme 
Court. A Presidential decree provided instructions for the election of Gacaca judges. The 
elections of Gacaca judges took place between the 4
th
 and the 7
th
 of October 2001. A total of 258 
000 judges were elected.
84
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ii. The Gacaca courts and the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (SNJG) 
It took time, from 2001 to 2002, for the Department of Gacaca jurisdictions, which eventually 
became the National Service of Gacaca jurisdictions (SNJG), to decide on the specifics of the 
procedures of these courts. The organic law was brief and did not offer sufficient guidance. As 
this law was difficult to implement, the Department of Gacaca jurisdictions needed to be 
inventive in order to provide the courts with understandable procedures. 
With the implementation of the new Constitution in 2003, the Department of Gacaca became 
autonomous, and was separated from the Supreme Court. This new department, consisting of all 
the Gacaca Courts was called ‘Service National des Jurisdictions Gacaca” in French (SNJG) or 
National Service of Gacaca Courts (NSGC).
85
 Since then, there have been more changes to the 
Gacaca courts system, because procedures needed to adapt to the requirements of the population. 
A dynamic and flexible system, the law has been changed more than five times
86
. 
According to the Ministry of Justice, Gacaca courts are to come to an end in June 2012. 
iii. Analysis of Gacaca jurisdictions according the Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001  
At the start of Gacaca there were four levels of tribunal that were organised according to the 
category of criminals and the level of appeal. These were: 
1) a court of the cell 
2) a court of the sector 
3) a court of the district  
4) a court of the province. 
Each Gacaca court had three organs:  
1) the bench 
2) the co-ordination committee 
3) the general assembly. 
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This structure almost did not work, as it started only at the cell level. It was repealed by the 
Gacaca Organic Law revision of 2004 (referred to as Organic Law No 16/2004 of 19/6/2004). 
This law established the organisation, competence and functioning of Gacaca courts charged 
with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide of the Tutsi in 1994. The 
four levels of Gacaca were reduced to three levels, bringing them closer to the populace than the 
district and the provincial levels, and thus make it easier to search for evidence. 
The restructured Gacaca Courts were arranged as follows: 
1)  the court of the cell 
2)  the court of the sector  
3)  the court of appeal at sector level. 
At the beginning of the Gacaca system, Organic Law No 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 aimed at 
simplifying the work of judges by putting suspects into one of four categories according to the 
role they had played during the genocide. This law was not used, as it was repealed in 2004 
before judgments started.  
The categories under the revised Gacaca law in 2004 were as follows: 
 First Category 
1.      The person, together with his or her accomplices, whose criminal acts or criminal 
participation placed them among the planners, organisers, instigators, supervisors and ringleaders 
of the genocide or crimes against humanity.  
2.      The person who, at that time he committed these offences or encouraged other people to 
commit them, together with his or her accomplices, was in the organs of leadership, at the 
national level, at the level of Prefecture, Sub-prefecture, Commune, in political parties, army, 
gendarmerie, communal police, religious denominations or in the militia. 
3.      The well-known murderer, together with his or her accomplices, who distinguished him or 
herself in the location where he or she lived or wherever he or she passed, because of the zeal 
















4.      The person, together with his or her accomplices, who committed acts of torture against 
others, even though they did not result in death. 
5.      The person, together with his or her accomplices, who committed acts of rape or acts of 
torture against sexual organs. 
6.      The person, together with his or her accomplices, who committed dehumanising acts on the 
dead bodies. 
 
 Second Category 
1. The person, together with his or her accomplices, whose criminal acts or criminal participation 
placed them among killers or who committed acts of serious attacks against others, causing 
death. 
2. The person, together with his or her accomplices, who injured or committed other acts of 
serious attacks with the intention to kill people but who did not attain his or her objective. 
3. The person, together with his or her accomplices, who committed or aided to commit other 
offences against persons, without the intention to kill them.  
 Third Category 
The person who committed only offences against property. 
 
iv.      The participation of the inhabitants in Gacaca Courts and the General Assembly  
The Gacaca Court of the Cell is comprised of 
1) A General Assembly made up of the residents of that cell who are 18 years old and 
above. The quorum required is 100 people. It is an open floor to residents and non-
residents of the cell and foreigners, and is a public meeting unless the Gacaca decides the 
doors should be closed. 
2) A Seat for the Court. 
3) A Co-ordinating Committee made up of the President of the court, two vice-presidents 
and two secretaries. 















1) A Sector General Assembly 
2) A Seat for the Gacaca Court  
3) A Co-ordinating Committee. 
At the beginning of Gacaca in 2001, the number of judges was set at 19 with five deputies, but 
the Gacaca law of 2004 reduced that number to nine judges and five deputies, and eventually, 
after the reform of Gacaca law of 2004, to seven judges and two deputies. 
The General Assembly is the cornerstone of the Gacaca system because it provides all the 
information publicly and democratically. Whoever has something to say is allowed the floor to 
speak. Articles 29 and 30 of the Gacaca law provide punishment of three months imprisonment 
for anyone who knowingly withholds information about what happened in 1994. If a judge wants 
to testify in a case he will request to be replaced by a deputy judge for that specific case. 
A witness or a survivor who does not live in the cell may be summoned to appear before the 
court if needed to provide information. 
v. The procedure before Gacaca  
The procedure within a Gacaca court has four stages  
1. The collection of information and the process of reconciliation through the Gacaca 
system 
The genocide was carried out primarily in the open and in broad daylight. Hence many people 
were witnesses to what happened. The planners of the genocide had tried to exterminate all the 
Tutsi, so that there would be none to tell the story
87
. Accordingly, when justice was later sought, 
only survivors and some moderate Hutu were willing to testify. At first it was not easy to get 
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information because the Hutu had been told that, if no one said anything, justice would be 
impossible and they could not be sentenced.
88
 
The first obstacle faced by the Gacaca was silence, an unwillingness to testify. Gacaca tried to 
solve this problem by insisting that everybody in the process had to say who his neighbour was 
and what had happened to him or her. A certain procedure had to be respected because asking 
directly might not have produced reliable answers.  
First, people who were living in the cell at the start of the genocide were listed, then lists of the 
names of those who had died were compiled and details of the destruction of their properties. 
After those lists had been compiled, it was necessary to provide information as to how each 
victim was killed, by whom, when and where. The neighbours did not respond immediately; 
almost all claimed that they were sick when the genocide happened. But slowly the truth 
emerged at different Gacaca meetings.
89
 
The writer remembers a meeting of a Gacaca Court in Rukara, Eastern Province, when 
everybody kept silent. After a while, the judge said that the compensation for that murdered 
Tutsi must be paid by the suspect who was already in prison for the murder of a neighbour, and 
that it had to be taken from the property of the suspect’s family. At that stage, the suspect’s sister 
put up her hand to speak and said that she could not accept that only her brother should be held 
responsible for the compensation. Then she started to denounce others who had participated in 
the killing. 
One lesson from that Gacaca was that the meeting helped to uncover many things because of the 
participation of all the residents of a certain area. 
After a time the public discussions of the events in 1994 resulted in much information being 
obtained about who had been killed, when and how and where the body had been put or thrown. 
The names of the perpetrators were thus revealed, not by means of forcing unwilling suspects to 
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talk, but as part of the logical development of a public narrative. This was not revealed as the 
result of gossip between small groups but in the open in an audience of many hundreds, 
sometimes thousands. People were held to a high standard of honesty by the community. After 
the first account of one event, others followed to clarify or to add to the story and subsequently 
the whole story would slowly be uncovered.
90
 
The reconciliation of the survivors with other people started when a Hutu was able to dissociate 
himself from the perpetrators to tell the story of how some Hutu had killed Tutsi and to show 
where the bodies had been placed, or when a Hutu decided to plead guilty and to tell the truth 
about the Tutsi he had killed. As a result many survivors managed to obtain information about 
the fate of their loved ones, and, after the resting place of the corpses had been identified, they 
could give them a dignified burial and obtain some closure and a healing of their trauma.
91
 
Through this process the Tutsi survivors were able to accept that not all Hutu were killers. They 
could then start to communicate sincerely about Hutu and Tutsi issues and the genocide. But it 
was not an easy thing to do. Many Tutsi were unwilling to talk with Hutu people, the perception 
being that all Hutu were perpetrators. Through the Gacaca courts, people were able to see who 
among the general public was a killer and who was not. The Tutsi could start to talk to the 
innocent with an open heart. Tutsi also could feel a certain amount of sympathy for someone 
who pleaded guilty and repented, in part because from the killer he was able to obtain 
information he needed. 
Gacaca has been a bridge to the unity of the survivors. One of them stated: “Gacaca is important 
for us survivors because it helps us to live and work in the community again …All the survivors 
come together and talk about what happened. We realise that we are in the same situation, that 




2.      The writing up of the indictment against the accused person  
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The information obtained during the collection phase provided facts and evidence sufficient to 
issue an indictment against suspects who had been named. A list of accused was compiled in this 
way, and a file or a dossier prepared with each person on that list placed in one of the three 
categories. At the end of the categorisation, the files were sent to the formal court and to the 
Gacaca court of sector respectively for those in categories one and two. 
According to the Gacaca Organic Law of 2004, those of the first category were sent to the 
prosecutor who had to prosecute them before the formal courts. The Gacaca cell had to send the 
indictments of criminals of category two to the President of the Gacaca Court of sector. As the 
category three was tried by the Gacaca Court of the cell, the indictments were to remain in the 
cell. 
In 2008 it was decided that all persons suspected of being involved in the genocide would be 
tried in a Gacaca court (except those who had planned the genocide, of whom there were only a 
few hundred) because the formal tribunal would not finish trying all the Category One cases 
within a reasonable time.
93
 
As of November 2010, the number of genocidaires who were judged by Gacaca courts was over 
1.2 million people according to the National Service of the Gacaca jurisdictions.  
3. The judgment of the accused person and the penalties imposed 
a. Judgment 
The Gacaca trial starts when a citation is issued to all parties concerned, providing them with a 
date that allows them a minimum of eight days preparation for the trial. Everything is organised 
to ensure that the accused is well aware of the date so that he is prepared. During that time the 
accused can call his witnesses. 
In the search of information in 2003, the Gahini Gacaca court received an e-mailed testimony 
from England. An Englishman, who had been the Director of the Gahini Anglican Hospital in the 
Eastern Province of Rwanda until the 1994 genocide, submitted his testimony electronically. He 
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testified about his deputy, who was accused before the Gacaca of having called in killers to 
murder Tutsi who were hidden in the hospital.  
Traditional legal principles were well respected by Gacaca judges, for example, the right of 
defence and the proof needed to substantiate charges against a defendant. The judges were also 
obliged to search for evidence, and not to rely only on the accusations for a verdict. The judges 
were also advised to conduct their own investigation in order to ascertain the truth. 
The judges knew that it is forbidden to try someone on charges for which he had already been 
tried; that the accused has the right to keep silent; that even convicted a suspect may benefit of 
light punishment if there are attenuating circumstances; that the accused has to be reminded of 
the advantages of pleading guilty
94
.  
During the trial, security and the freedom of speech were ensured to everybody. Lawyers did not 
wear their legal robes or gowns; anybody could request the opportunity to speak, including the 
defendant’s lawyer. The Gacaca judges only employed Gacaca law. Anybody who made claims 
that did not conform to the Gacaca law was asked to stop. On the day of the trial, the court 
reminded the accused of the provision given by article 62 of Gacaca Organic Law No 16/2004 of 
16/6/2004 which provides that:  
Any person who committed the offence of genocide and other crimes against 
humanity committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, may 
confess, plead guilty, repent and ask for forgiveness before a duly constituted 
competent bench. 
If the accused did not plead guilty, the Gacaca court judges then read out the accusation and gave 
the floor to those who could provide testimonies supporting the charges. After that, the suspect 
was given the opportunity to defend him or herself and provide evidence or witnesses to his 
version.  
Then the floor was given to the assembly who could express their opinions on the trial.  At this 
stage new witnesses were brought in. Some gave their views about the case and debate continued 
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until things were clear. The case ran from morning to evening and, if it had not finished then, it 
would continue on a day decided by the court, until the case was closed.  
Once the court found that enough information had been gathered, the President asked the 
secretaries, who were also judges, to read what they had written during the day. If there was a 
complaint about clarity or omitted information, the secretary made a suitable correction, and 
asked parties and witnesses to sign what they had said. Everything said and done during the 
Gacaca session was entered into a Cahier d`activités (Book of Activities). Before the President 
closed the court, he announced the next session and what cases would be heard at that session. 
Sometimes the court adjourned and pronounced its sentence the same day, but usually the 
sentence given over the next few days.  
b.      Penalties  
Category 1 offenders included planners, organisers and officials at national or prefectural levels. 
These individuals were tried by ordinary courts which were the Intermediate courts, while others 
(inciters, supervisors, and ringleaders of the genocide, any leader from the sub-prefecture to 
commune levels suspected of genocide or crime against humanity; rapists and suspects of sexual 










Refused to plead 
guilty 
Before ordinary 




20-24 years 25-30 years Life imprisonment 
 Category 2 
Sub-categories Pleaded guilty before 
the denunciation 
Pleaded guilty after 
the denunciation  
Refused to plead 
guilty 
Notorious zealous 6-7 years 6 yrs 6 moths – 7 10-15 years 
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A sixth is served in 
custody. A third of 
sentence suspended, 
half  commuted into 
community service 
(called TIG or 
Travaux d`Intérêt 
Général) 
years 6 months, half 
commuted in 
community into 
service while a third 
is served in custody, 
a sixth of the 
sentence is 










Idem Idem idem 
Dehumanizing act on 








Killings and attacks 
resulting in death and 
accomplices  
2yrs 6 months - 3yrs 
6 months 
A third of sentence 
suspended ,a sixth of 
sentence served in 
custody and half 
commuted into 
community service 
4-5yrs a third of 
sentence in Custody; 
A sixth of sentence 
suspended 
Half of sentence 
commuted into 
community service. 
4 yrs and 6 months -  
5 yrs and 6 months 
Attacker aiming to 
kill though the death 
did not occur and 
accomplices. 
Idem idem Idem 
Attack with no aim 
to kill and 
accomplices 
6 months- 18 months 
1/6 of sentence 
served in custody, a 
third of sentence 
suspended 
Half of sentence 
commuted into 
community service 
18 months -2 yrs 
 6 months 
A third of sentence 
served in custody, 
1/6 suspended; half 
commuted into 
community service 
2 yrs 6 months-3 yrs 
6 months 
Third of sentence 
served in custody; 
1/6 of sentence 
suspended 
Half commuted into 
community service 















D.  The implementation of the sentence and the community service (TIG) 
Rwandan prisons are able to hold no more than 18 000 people.
96
 After the genocide in 1994, the 
country had more than 130 000 suspects. This number continued to grow as the Gacaca courts 
operated, but it decreased from 2003 when many prisoners were released by a Presidential 
communiqué. 
One solution to the shortage of prison space was non-custodial sentencing. So it was decided to 
implement community service (referred to in French as Travaux d`Intérêt Général TIG), as a 
form of punishment for people who pleaded guilty, told the truth and repented for the deeds they 
had committed. These people had half of their prison time commuted to community work. TIG 
was also possible for some smaller crimes committed during the genocide. TIG was performed 
during the day allowing the criminal to return home in the evening. This was an attractive option 




After the Gacaca courts had started to operate, the Executive Secretariat of TIG was created to 
plan its implementation.  
Thus Gacaca sentences could be carried out both in prisons and/or in TIG service. At the time 
this thesis was being written, the 2011 TIG`s Executive Secretariat report stated that 45 806 out 
of 84 888 criminals had complet d their community service.  
The value of the community service for one year (2010-2011) amounted to Rwanda Francs 7 138 
031 562, the equivalent to almost US $12 million according to the TIG report. The community 
service was a useful tool that helped with disclosure of the truth and reconciliation, and, of 
course, it was preferable to full-term imprisonment.   
Article 80 of Gacaca Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 as amended in 2008 reads: 
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A person sentenced to both a custodial sentence and to serve community service shall 
first serve community service and if it is proved that the work was exemplary 




Gacaca law has been criticised for being too lenient on criminals who showed good behaviour 
while on their community service. This meant that someone who had been a serial killer of Tutsi 
people during the genocide, who had pleaded guilty and received a sentence of community 
service, could actually avoid serving any time in prison.
98
  
 E. Criticism of Gacaca courts and human rights issues  
Some observers of the Gacaca process have expressed positive views on Gacaca. However, 
Human Right Watch and Amnesty International have not viewed them favourably.
99
 The Gacaca 
trials resulted in the sentencing of number of suspects who had not expected their deeds to be 
uncovered, and helped to heal trauma by giving the survivors and suspects a space for 
dialogue.
100
 Once the involvement of hidden genocidaires had been disclosed by Gacaca, their 
relatives were unhappy and began to criticise the whole process of Gacaca. 
The following, however, are some views of observers who had taken time to visit many Gacaca 
courts and interview participants: 
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Many Rwandans view Gacaca as a forum in which all members of the community, 
suspects, survivors and the general population can debate and discuss legal and non-




….In particular, Gacaca shows how a cliché of transitional societies can work in 
practice, namely, that there can be no reconciliation without justice. The key to 
understand how it deliberately shapes justice toward reconciliatory ends, in ways that 





Boniface a survivor of genocide living in Kigali described the importance of Gacaca in this way:  
At Gacaca the truth frees us from the weight we have carried around since the 
genocide. Gacaca is important because it allows us to be together and to hear the truth 
and to learn to live together again ….I will go to Gacaca and ask the prisoners who 
come from the jail to speak the truth about what they did… There are many lies at 
Gacaca. But the community will refute them and the judges will get to the truth and 
make a record of the prisoners` crimes. Then I will feel as if all these things have 
finished and life will start again.
103
  
Earlier in this chapter it was shown how, before the use of Gacaca, communication between 
Hutu and Tutsi was impossible. Gacaca have been able to engage those two peoples in a 
dialogue. 
Very harsh violations of human rights had taken place on a large scale in the genocide which had 
taken the lives of 1 050 000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Common sense would thus dictate a 
severe punishment for the perpetrators; the light punishment actually given to them was far from 
the ideals of retributive justice. The issue of compensation for victims of Tutsi genocide in 
Rwanda neither interested the Gacaca courts nor the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 
ICTR.
104
 It was surprising that none of the Human Rights organisations mentioned this issue 
until it was raised in 2010 by Human Right Watch.  
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Gacaca has been criticised for not having dealt with the crimes committed against Hutu during 
the genocide of Tutsi between April and July 1994 when the genocide was taking place. During 
the fighting RPF soldiers shot and killed Hutu, whether soldiers, Interahamwe and civilians, with 
machetes and arms to stop them killing Tutsi. The RPF soldiers were fighting to stop the 
genocide during a period of inaction from the international community, which stood aside. 
The Hutu wanted those killings to be perpetrated at the same level as the genocide so that they 
would be given amnesty. In this way they hoped to claim for those deaths a moral equivalent to 
the genocide killings. If the Hutu and Tutsi killed one another, they argued, then why should the 
killing of Tutsi be labelled genocide, and not the other way round? However, the RPF did not set 
out to kill Hutu because they were Hutu. In fact, there were some isolated killings of Hutu by 
RPF soldiers, who took revenge for their family members, who had been wiped out during the 
genocide, and were tried before Rwanda military courts
105
. The said killings were not sufficiently 





























Accused 2 1 14 12 4 1 1 5 1 1 4 46 
 
One wonders why such criticism arose, seeing that these crimes were tried by the formal courts 
before the creation of Gacaca. People had been told to bring to the prosecutor all complaints 
about crimes committed by RPF soldiers to enable him to file cases against them and over a 
thousand files of cases were tried before the ordinary courts.
106
 
Gacaca has also been criticized for not allowing lawyers to defend the genocide suspects during 
the hearings.
107
 This is a misunderstanding of how Gacaca works. One must remember that 
Gacaca operated on a very large scale, with 12 103 courts working on the same day in a country 
that only had 300 lawyers. How would a legal defence be possible for all suspects with so few 
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lawyers? Another reason was that, in Gacaca, there were no prosecutors - and even the judges 
were not lawyers. It would have created an imbalance if defence lawyers were allowed. 
In Gacaca courts everybody had the right to speak when given the floor, even lawyers, who 
happened to be present, were not forbidden to come into the Gacaca court and could give their 
ideas about how the trial was being carried out. They did not, however, have the monopoly of 
speaking on behalf of the accused, as it is the case in the formal justice system, and their role had 
to comply with the Gacaca law. Regarding the exclusion of the lawyers, Dr Phil Clark, a political 
researcher, wrote that it: “is meant to maximise the community`s sense of ownership over the 
process and consequently its personnel and interpersonal effects”. In addition articles 2, 64, 65 
and 66 of Gacaca organic law No 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 concerning the procedure of hearings, 
implicitly provides for the exclusion of lawyers even if this is not explicitly mentioned.  
It has also been previously stated that in the Gacaca courts the public served as lawyers for 
everyone, especially when somebody took the floor to prove a point in the defence or 
prosecution of a suspect. Gacaca differs from ordinary courts because it allows a debate to take 
place among the residents of a given area, allowing any of them to talk about what happened. 
Whoever is present can discuss or testify about the role played (or not) by an accused, given that 
the genocidal attacks were mostly committed during the day in full public view. 
It is alleged that people were reluctant to testify in Gacaca because of fear of being ostracised or 
intimidated by government officials or influential people.
108
 This is irrelevant, for the same could 
be said anywhere in the world. Lawyers for the defence are only happy with the sentence when 
the accused is acquitted. And, it is very difficult to be impartial when one knows that in Rwanda 
the perpetrators and the survivors of genocide are still living together side by side. 
In conclusion, many critics like Human Rights Watch have not participated objectively in 
Gacaca session or have done so rarely. Generally, one finds little truth in the reports of some 
NGO and do not give a correct account of the general situation.
109
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Some HRW criticisms come from the perpetrators or their relatives. Some of the criticism relies 
on an analysis of the statutes establishing the Gacaca, and thereby misses the dynamic nature of 
these courts on a daily running basis.
110
  
Gacaca has been criticised by HRW on the grounds that it fails to protect innocent suspects, but 
this criticism lacks substance because the Gacaca law provides for a bench of seven independent 
judges to decide by majority of the bench. The law also provides for a level of appeal at the 
Gacaca sector and also for a revision
111
 of the appeal sentence if there are obvious mistakes. All 
those mechanisms protect innocent suspects, and, with the co-ordination of the National Service 
of Gacaca Jurisdictions, suspects have a reasonable guarantee of a fair judgment. 
Gacaca courts, however, made it possible for justice to be done without too long a delay. They 
secured the accused’s right to have access to justice within a reasonable time. Analysing the 
criminal competence of African traditional courts Professor Tom Bennett thinks that: “the 
advantages of these courts clearly outweighed their disadvantages:  they were simple, informal, 
cheap, accessible and familiar with the laws and affairs of their community”.
112
 
In less than ten years Gacaca have been able to deliver justice to more than one million suspects 
of genocide in Rwanda. No other form of justice would have been able to do this. This fact alone 
should be sufficient to counter any criticism of possible Gacaca shortcomings. To quote 
Professor Tom Bennett again: “[a]nother point frequently overlooked is the fact that proceedings 
in Western style courts may well offend African views of fairness, and, in certain respects, 
traditional courts may come closer to realising human rights than formal state courts”.
113
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DISCUSSION OF THE NATURE OF THE GACACA COURTS USING THE 
CONCEPTS OF RESTORATIVE AND RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Section 1 Introduction 
Researchers have shown interest in the nature of Gacaca courts for many reasons. One is the 
serious and horrific nature of the crimes they were used to try. These are the crimes of genocide 
and crimes against humanity committed by civilians and soldiers. Typically, these are crimes that 
are reserved for the High Courts under domestic laws or for the International Criminal Courts. 
Gacaca courts were created in 2001. Before that, the genocide crimes were tried in the regular 
Rwandan courts. In 1998 the Government of Rwanda made the decision to hand these cases over 
to lay judges using the traditional means of resolving conflicts: Gacaca. This was done to speed 
up the process of trying the suspects of genocide, who were filling prisons across the country. 
This writer recalls having to answer people with an international reputation who wanted to know 
whether the Gacaca courts were really being launched by the Government to clear the prisons as 
there were 130 000 awaiting trial prisoners, some who had been there for eight years since 1994. 
The decision to use Gacaca courts surprised many people. Many observers were curious to see 
how that kind of court could be used to tr  someone of the most heinous crimes in the world. It 
took four years, from 1999 to 2002, before the system effectively started.   
Government needed to convince stakeholders both within and outside the country that this 
exceptional system of justice, which was unfamiliar to the critics, was relevant, applicable and 
viable.  
The officials explained that the Gacaca courts had four main objectives.
114
 These were: 
1. to reveal the truth about what happened in 1994; 
2. to speed up the trials of suspects; 
3. to eradicate the perceived culture of impunity; 
4. to effect reconciliation. 
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When the people understood those objectives and, especially, given that Gacaca was grass- roots 
based, the process of reconciliation became apparent and some started to describe it as a 
restorative justice system. That name was not yet used by Government officials because they did 
not want to confuse Rwandans who were familiar with Gacaca as a system used to assist 
villagers with conflicts between themselves. 
Since then many writers have produced articles and books on Gacaca labelling it restorative 
justice or retributive justice, some, like Nicolas A Jones saying that “The Gacaca combines 
elements of both restorative and retributive justice”
115
. There is much interest in analyzing the 
real nature of Gacaca mainly because writers are far from obtaining a consensus on the issue.
116
  
According to Lars Waldolf, Gacaca is a failed experiment in restorative justice
117
. He believes 
that “Restorative justice is impossible without reparations for survivors of mass atrocities”
118
. Of 
course, according to advocates of pure restorative justice, reparation is a very important element. 
Hence, they do not consider Gacaca restorative justice, as in most Gacaca trials no reparation 
was made, except for money paid for restitution of property by some criminals of category III. 
Lars missed the point that the Government of Rwanda never had claimed or intended that Gacaca 
should be a restorative justice program. 
In this chapter, Section One will explore the concept of restorative justice and try to compare its 
elements with those of Gacaca. Section Two analyses to what extent Gacaca remains retributive 
justice, given that it tried cases using the processes it inherited from the formal courts, which 
began the prosecutions with retributive justice in mind. By using the concepts of restorative and 
retributive justice, Sectio  Three will compare the findings in the first two sections in order to 
situate Gacaca courts and define their real nature.  
Section 2 Restorative Justice and Gacaca Courts 
A. The Concept of Restorative Justice  
Restorative justice defers punishment of the offender and prioritises reparation and restoration to 
the victim by the offender. It “rejects, at least in principle, the retributive logic of punishing harm 
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. This is most often achieved through mediation between victim and offender with 
the assistance of a facilitator, or through a conference in the presence of the families and friends 




Circle sentencing is more extensive than mediation and conference; it gathers: 
[Victims, offenders, their families and supporters, any other interested member of the 
community (whether or not they have knowledge of the parties or the crime), and 
criminal justice personnel participating as equal members]… Participants are given 
uninterrupted time, in turn, to say whatever they wish that is related to the purpose of 
the circle in which they hold the talking piece. Circles are used for purposes other than 
sentencing. They may be used to solve a community problem, to provide support and 
care for victims or offenders (sometimes to prepare them for a sentencing circle) and to 
consider how to receive offenders who have been imprisoned back into community. 
There can be considerable overlap in the approaches taken by VOM (victim-offender 
mediation), conferencing and circles.
121
 
For restorative justice a punishment is simply another harm inflicted on a member of the 
community, subsequent to the harm caused by the offender’s wrongdoing. 
Therefore, a key characteristic of restorative justice is a move away from punishing the offender 
(retributive justice) in favour of healing the victim, with the offender offering the victim 
reparation and an apology. 
Even if researchers have not yet fully agreed on a definition of restorative justice, Yvon 
Dandurand et al have managed to encompass the general idea both in its encounter process and 
reparative conceptions: 
[a] Restorative process is any process in which the victim and the offender and, where 
appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by a crime 
participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, 
generally with the help of a facilitator.
122
 
From this it is evident that restorative justice is not simply a court trial; rather it is an encounter 
between offender and victim that aims to change the traditional way of dealing with a crime 
(punishment) towards restoration of the wrong by the offender who has to take on responsibility 
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for the consequences of his wrongdoing vis-à-vis the victim. Restorative justice, in the Western 
World, started in Canada in 1974 (in the Elmira case) in the form of VOM (victim - offender - 
mediation) in minor crimes, but more recently it has been used to deal with violent crimes. This 
form of restorative justice was further developed in the form of family group conferencing 
(FGC) in 1989, under provisions of the Children, Young Persons and Families Act in New 
Zealand and it continues to expand and grow as an alternative to retributive punishment
123
. 
Restorative Justice is well developed in North America (USA and Canada), the UK, New 
Zealand and Australia, and it is beginning to be considered in Africa and other parts of the world. 
Restorative justice takes many different forms. Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. Van Ness have 
drawn up a list of criteria to characterise any alternative to the formal justice system that could 
be called restorative justice. According to these standards, for such an alternative to be called 
restorative justice, one or more of the following must be present: 
a. a relatively informal process which aims to involve victims, offenders and others closely 
connected to them or to the crime in a discussion of matters, such as what happened, what 
harm resulted and what should be done to repair that harm, and, perhaps, how to prevent 
further wrongdoing or conflict. 
b. an emphasis on empowering (in a number of senses) ordinary people whose lives are 
affected by a crime or other wrongful act. 
c. some effort by decision-makers or those facilitating decision-making processes to promote 
a response which is geared less towards stigmatizing and punishing the wrongdoer and 
more towards ensuring that wrongdoers recognize and meet a responsibility to make 
amends for the harm they have caused in manner which directly benefits those harmed, as a 
first step towards their reintegration into the community of law-abiding citizens. 
d. decision-makers or those facilitating decision-making ensuring that the decision making 
process and its outcome will be guided by certain principles or values which, in 
contemporary society, are widely regarded as desirable in any interaction between people, 
such as: respect for others; avoidance of violence and coercion if possible, and minimised if 
not; and inclusion in preference to exclusion. 
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e.  decision-makers or those facilitating decision-making devoting significant attention to the 
injury done to the victims and to the needs that result from that, and to tangible ways in 
which those needs can be addressed. 
f. some emphasis on strengthening or repairing relationships between people, using the power 




Restorative justice may also be understood as a voluntary encounter between the victim and the 
offender in which the latter agrees to: listen respectfully to the former, answer any questions 
he/she may have, and to apologize and agree to reasonable reparative actions which may be 
suggested.
125
 The advocates of restorative justice hold that in this process both parties (victim 
and offender) must be treated with respect, as persons with dignity, worth and wisdom
126
. 
The proponents of restorative justice assign to it another goal, one which does not capture the 
attention of retributive justice: the “collateral” of the incident, for example, the family of the 
offender, which has done nothing wrong but suffers the consequences of the harm
127
. Hence, the 





1. Restorative justice and Gacaca courts 
To recapitulate, the core principles of restorative justice can be globally characterized as 
containing the three following elements as described by Yvon Dandurand and Curt T. Griffiths: 
Encounter, Reparation and Transformation.
129
 
I. Elements which characterize restorative justice 
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i. Encounter between the victim and the offender in which the offender answers 
the questions of the victim
130
. This encounter will be held in the case of 
offenders who admit responsibility for the offence before they undergo the 
process of restorative justice. If they claim innocence, then they will appear 
before a traditional retributive court. 
ii. The reparation and apology by the offender131. The offender must make 
reparation for the wrong committed to the victim and apologize with remorse. 
iii. The move away from punishment132. In this process, the offender is not 
penalised, as this is viewed as creating additional harm over and above that 
suffered by the victim.  
iv. Healing and reconciliation133. The offender’s apology assists the victims in 
their healing after the offence, thereby easing their fear and hatred and 
preparing them for the reconciliation process.  
v. Respecting all parties during the process134. The advocates of restorative 
justice recommend proceeding with the process in a climate of respect for all 
parties. This may however not be easy when the offender has perpetrated a 
crime of grave violence.   
vi. Good management of all the consequences of the crime. It may seem too 
ambitious an objective, but restorative justice processes aim to consider and 
solve holistically all the issues generated by the crime.  
Having described, broadly, the aspects of restorative justice, is it now possible to test Gacaca 
courts to see whether they qualify as a restorative justice system.  
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A. Analysis of compatibility with the elements of restorative justice and Gacaca courts 
i. Encounter between victim and offender. 
The VOM (victim -offender - mediation) process is  more appropriate and easier to apply for 
isolated crimes between a given victim and an offender than it is instances of collective crimes, 
like genocide which is committed on a large scale by many offenders against thousands of 
victims. Many people were involved in the killings in Rwanda; the Gacaca courts deal with such 
situations because in each cell of the country there could be hundreds of people accused of 
participating, in different ways, in the genocide. Many families were also exterminated, so no 
member is left to participate in these processes. Therefore one survivor may perceive him or 
herself to represent all those who perished. It is therefore difficult to create an encounter between 
victims and offenders as in normal situation. As a result, Gacaca uses collective encounters 
where survivors are few. But any survivor who has any information about a suspect is allowed to 
denounce him or her. It is also the same for accused who are absent during the hearings because 
of flight since 1994.
135
 
In the Gacaca courts four types of stakeholders gather: a) offenders, b) survivors (few or 
absent)
136
, c) judges and d) community members. Each group plays its role in the process, which 
differentiates Gacaca from formal courts, where there are two opposing sides – the offender and 
the victim - leaving no place for the community. To a certain extent Gacaca is similar to a 




The offenders do not come voluntarily to the Gacaca nor do they necessarily admit their criminal 
role in the genocide. They are summoned to the court, as is the case in the formal court, whether 
they plead guilty or not. Often the accused plead not guilty and defend themselves by claiming 
innocence, while the survivors, who know very well the wrongs they have suffered, accuse them. 
As this is the case in Gacaca, it is a legal battle unlike the peaceful encounter of restorative 
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However, something beneficial takes place in this encounter. The survivors are given a space to 
tell their stories, to be heard as they relate quietly their suffering and the losses they suffered 
during the hundred days of genocide. This space for healing and disclosure is not an opportunity 
provided in formal court hearings. Furthermore, the Gacaca courts provide an audience (the 
community) who give the victims enough of their time to hear them properly. This is in itself 
therapeutic.  
 
The Gacaca courts provide official acknowledgement of the suffering of the victims during the 
genocide. It is greatly beneficial in the healing of post-traumatic stress syndrome for victims to 
get the opportunity to tell their story.
139
 The processes of the Gacaca courts are restorative for the 
victims, as well as the offenders, who are made aware of the personal suffering they have caused 
and are given an opportunity to express their apology in public. Comparatively, the impact of a 
VOM restorative justice process and a Gacaca court is very similar. The Gacaca are restorative in 
the encounter that they facilitate between victim and offender. Therefore they pass test of 
encounter of offenders and victims. 
 
ii. The test of reparation and apology by the offender.  
Whereas, in pure restorative justice, reparation and apology are given by the relatively willing 
offender after an encounter in VOM, in Gacaca courts there is no discussion of reparation except 
for the restitution of belongings destroyed or pillaged. No reparation is paid for the killings and 
other harm suffered by victims. 
There have been criticisms that in many cases offenders who admit guilt do not offer very 
sincere apologies
140
. According to Article 54 of Gacaca organic Law (No 16/2004 of 19
th
 June 
2004), he who pleads guilty has to repent and apologize to victims and to the Rwandan Society. 
In Gacaca courts, there are “collective encounters” which are not of voluntary offenders and 
victims; there is no reparation and not every offender pleads guilty. Article 96 of the Gacaca 
organic law does not prescribe reparation to be given by the offender. Therefore Gacaca courts 
fail in the test of reparation and apology because the reparation must be complete and the 
apology sincere. 
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iii. The test of the move away from punishment 
Here the difference between Gacaca courts and the pure restorative justice which rejects 
punishment is noteworthy. Indeed, article 72 of Gacaca organic law (No 16/2004 of 19/6/2004) 
prescribes penalties of imprisonment from life to a number of years. For example, “The Gacaca 
court of Ntyazo, in Nyanza district, meted out life imprisonment to Juvénal Masabo Nyangezi. 
This singer, who was tried in absentia, was found guilty of "incitement to commit genocide in 
the prefectures of Butare and Gikongoro", in the south of Rwanda”
141
. Also, “Gacaca court in 
Nyakabanda (Kigali) found Valerie Bemeriki, guilty of "planning of genocide, incitement to 
commit genocide, complicity in murder of several people and families."
142
 Therefore the 
Gacaca fails the test of moving away the punishment.  
 
iv. The test of healing and the reconciliation 
It was explained above the ways in which the Gacaca encounters are beneficial both for 
survivors and offenders: because the process of reconciliation is accelerated as the survivor is 
heard and healed. Reconciliation is nonetheless a gradual process that occurs when the victims 
are satisfied that their sufferings have been acknowledged. The time that it takes depends on the 
gravity of the crime. Thus the length of time is proportional to the suffering, the sincerity of the 
apology and the peaceful future behaviour of the offender. Gacaca courts have helped victims 
(survivors) to obtain information about what happened to their loved ones and where their bodies 
were deposited. This has enabled burial ceremonies to be carried out, and closure to be obtained. 
Such important evidence of admission of guilt was unlikely to be obtained in the formal justice 
system. Furthermore, the encounter between survivors and accused assists the peaceful  
co-existence of perpetrators and victims who live alongside one another as villagers. In this way 
Gacaca courts succeed in the test of healing and reconciliation. 
 
v. The test of respect of all parties during the process 
Gacaca courts deal with accused persons who were either in prison or still free. Both are treated 
similar to the way in which they would be treated by a formal court. No particular consideration 
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of friendship or special treatment is offered to those who have been accused of genocidal 
atrocities. The proponents of restorative justice suggest a particular treatment especially that 
which somewhat makes it different to how the offender is treated in the formal justice system: 
“[t]he process is characterized by respectful treatment of all parties. It is also one that promotes 
the participation and, to a varying extent, the empowerment of all parties concerned”
143
. 
Therefore Gacaca courts fail in the test of this respect mainly, because, if prima facie evidence is 
available, the court may decide to arrest the offender provisionally. 
 
vi. The test of holistic management of all consequences of the crime 
The mission of the Gacaca courts is to reveal the truth of what happened in the genocide. Many 
survivors were in hiding and could not see or to hear everything which happened, unlike Hutu 
who were not hunted. With that truth exposed, the Gacaca courts have to determine 
responsibilities and pass judgments of guilt or innocence. By doing this they are able to dismiss 
the general suspicion which was laid on all Hutu as having been killers.
144
 Gacaca courts have 
accelerated  trials and eased the process of reconciliation through the participatory discussions of 
what happened during the genocide, and some good initiatives of encounter process developed 




The context in which Gacaca courts have been working, especially in the limited time available, 
has not provided an opportunity for people to become aware of all the effects of the crime of 
genocide, for example, the suffering of families of the accused as a result of the imprisonment of 
a father or mother or both. Therefore Gacaca courts fail this test. 
 
In conclusion Gacaca courts fail to be restorative in four out of six of the items while succeeding 
in two so that Gacaca courts fail at 66, 6 per cent to be restorative while succeed to be restorative 
at 33.4per cent. 
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B.  Global understanding of restorative justice theories 
Writers about restorative justice appear to fall into two categories. One group holds a strict 
conception, also called pure restorative justice, and puts great emphasis on the encounter 
between victim and offender, reparation, reconciliation, healing and integration. This group tends 
to move away from punishment and focus on reparation and the needs of victims, offenders and 
the community. The other group discusses restorative justice from a larger more holistic 
perspective. This involves many practices, and will often try to address all of the effects of the 
crime. Both conceptions of restorative justice are broader than the formal justice, which deals 
with a very narrow project in its pursuit of justice.  
Paul McCold and Ted Wachtel
146
 classify the practices of restorative justice into three types: 
fully restorative, mostly restorative and partly restorative, as these involve victim reparation 
mechanisms, offender responsibility and the communities of care and reconciliation. They have 
represented these by means of the following diagram. 
 
The previous analysis based on tests 1-5 addresses the pure restorative justice and, to borrow the 
terms of McCold and Wachtel, those tests cover the fully restorative justice and mostly 
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restorative justice while test 6 emphasises the larger conception of restorative justice, which they 
call partly restorative justice. This is because it is an intervention occurring after there has been 
formal justice sentencing. It therefore focuses on the management of all the effects of that 
particular crime. Thus, taken alone, it is only partly restorative because it appears to complement 
retributive justice. 
Section 3 Retributive Justice and Gacaca Courts 
A. Concept of retributivitism 
Retributive justice refers to punishment which is seen as a repayment of a wrong done by the 
offender. Retributivism is defined by Black`s Law Dictionary
147
 as “[the]legal theory by which 
criminal punishment is justified, as long as the offender is morally accountable, regardless of 
whether deterrence or other good consequences would result”. According to the retributivism 
proponents “a criminal is thought to have a debt to pay to society, which is paid by 
punishment”
148
. The punishment is also sometimes said to be society`s act of paying back the 
criminal for the wrong done. Opponents of retributivism see it as “vindictive theory”. 
Maximalist retributivism proponents, such as Emmanuel Kant, submit that the society “has the 
duty not just a right to punish a criminal who is guilty and culpable”
149
. Proponents of minimalist 
retributivism, for their part, maintain that the judge may absolve the offender from punishment, 




Jeremy Sarkin notes that “knowing that there is a good chance of being prosecuted will deter 
many who may be tempted to commit human rights abuses.”
151
 
1. Theories of retributive justice  
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1) Deterrence refers to the deterrent effect that is created by the possibility of being 
punished for committing a particular crime
153
. 
2) Incapacitation is the process whereby an offender is rendered incapable of committing 
that offence or any offence again, this is done primarily through incarceration in prisons. 
An offender who is removed from society is unable, for that period of time, to harm the 
community or commit further criminal acts. 
3) Rehabilitation is the process through which an offender’s attitudes and behaviours are 
changed to prevent them from re-offending. This includes among other techniques 
treatment for drug addiction, alcoholism, therapy, life-skills.
154
 
4) Retribution is a theory with ancient roots dating back as far as Hammurabi’s code in 
Babylon, about 1780 BC, containing 282 laws
155
, with scaled punishments, adjusting "an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" to try to ensure that the punishment of the offender is 
equivalent to the harm inflicted on the victim. According to this theory the punishment 
must be proportionate to the crime.
156
 
Scholars of retributive justice say that the goal of punishment is twofold: utilitarian
157
 
(deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation) and retributive
158
. The 19th century, philosopher 
Immanuel Kant opposed utilitarianism and defended retributivism. He regarded punishment as a 
matter of justice. He stated that if the guilty were not punished, justice was not done
159
. In The 
Metaphysical Elements of Justice Kant wrote of retribution as a legal principle: "Judicial 
punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal 
himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground 
that he has committed a crime". 
The Kantian approach to justice is the opposite of restorative justice, which proposes a move 
away from punishment. Nonetheless, retributive justice is still the most common approach in 
formal criminal justice systems, globally. Restorative justice is a new response to crime – at least 
in the Western world. Presently, no country has adopted restorative justice to the exclusion of 
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retributive justice. Common punishments still include imprisonment, the death penalty, fines and 
the curtailing of freedom rights. 
The four elements of Crump, Cohen ‘et al’ may be used as elements to compare retributive 
justice and the Gacaca courts to see how far the latter constitutes a category of retributive justice. 
B. Comparisons 
a. Table of comparison of retributive justice and Gacaca courts (GC) using those four 
elements of Crump, Cohen, et al.  
Elements of comparison Retributive justice of Crump 
Cohen ‘et al’. 
Gacaca courts(GC) 
1. Deterrence  Yes  Yes, GC arrests and punishes 
genocidaires like other formal 
tribunals. 
2. Incapacitation  Yes  Yes, GC imprisons convicted 
people for up 30 years or life 
imprisonment.  
3. Rehabilitation  Yes   Not directly in GC`s business; 
Prison life may change the 
behaviour of inmate positively 
or negatively. There is not a 
clear rehabilitation programme 
in Gacaca although integration 
is done in the Gacaca process 
after imprisonment.  
4. Retribution  Yes  Yes, GC gives punishment 
according to the seriousness of 
the accused`s behaviour 
during the crime.  
If we look at the above table we may state that Gacaca courts incline more to retributive justice 
(at a range of 75 per cent) than they do to restorative justice. (The difference is 25 per cent.) 
There are other ways of comparing the differences between the Gacaca system with the 
retributive or restorative systems. The stakeholders (victims-offenders-community) differ
160
. 
Retributive or formal criminal justice signifies courts and tribunals, unlike the restorative system, 
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and both work with different stakeholders. In the restorative justice system stakeholders are the 
victims (mainly), the offender and the facilitator who sometimes is joined by another facilitator 
or community members. The retributive justice system, on the other hand, has as stakeholders 
the state prosecution, the offender and the judges. Sometime witnesses and the victim can join as 
well as secondary and less important stakeholders. In general, the strong role played by the state 
prosecution and the adjudication of the professional judges which characterize retributive justice 
system is absent in restorative justice. The role of the victim is not relevant in retributive justice 
because all his interests are said to be represented by the state prosecution. To the contrary, in 
restorative justice the victims themselves express their interests and needs. 
Punishment could be an element of comparison as well, as researchers like Clifford Shearing 
(2007), Gerry Johnstone and Daniel Van Ness (2007) regard the emphasis on whether or not to 
punishment is a characteristic of retributive justice.  
Below are three more tables of comparison, the first of the retributive and restorative justice 
systems using the aforementioned elements, the second a comparison of the retributive justice 
system and Gacaca courts and the third a comparison of restorative justice and Gacaca courts. 
b. Table of comparison of restorative and retributive justice. This table is designed to 
provide a clear understanding of the differences between the two systems of justice. 
Elements of comparison Retributive justice Restorative justice 
1. Main stakeholders  1. Prosecutor  - offender-
judge 
1. Victim-offender-facilitator  
2. Punishment  2. Imprisonment, fines, 
death penalty etc. - it 
might be proportionate to 
the offence. 
2.  Only Reparation and apology 
instead of punishment (which is 
harm), it has no place; the 
reparation, healing and 
reconciliation replace it. 
3. Role of victim Minor or absent. Generally 
represented by the 
prosecutor sometimes as 
witness.  
Major, initially to discuss his 
needs. 
4. Role of offender Shameful party, presumed 
innocent, right to keep 
silence. Not compelled to 
apologize to the victim or 
Respectable stakeholder, he 
should admit his offence but  is 
not compelled to do so as this is 















to admit the offence. the victim. 
5. Adjudication  Sentencing by the judge. No adjudication agent, the 
decision is made by consensus 
of the victim and offender 
through mediation. 
6. Reconciliation  Reconciliation is not an 
aim or the business of the 
court. 
Reconciliation is a target. 
7. Healing  Healing is not an aim, nor 
the business of the court. 
Healing is an aim targeted by the 
restorative justice. 
8. Role of 
Government 
officials  
None. Independence of the 
judiciary.  
None but secondary in some 
areas ( role of diversion) 
9. Role of the 
community 
None ,no participation Major through participation. 
10. Role of  defence 
lawyers  
Very important and 
constitutes the right of 
defence. 
Not important  
c. Table of comparison of retributive justice and Gacaca courts using the 10 elements 
as criteria of comparison. 
Elements of 
comparison 





No prosecutors. Offender –the community 
–the victims -judges. Anybody can accuse 
criminals if he /she has evidence.  
2. Punishment  2 Imprisonment, fines. death 
penalty etc, it might be 
proportionate to the offence. 
Life imprisonment or sentences of some 
years (article 72 of Gacaca organic  law  
of 2004 . 
3. Role of victim Smaller or absent. Generally 
represented by the prosecutor 
sometime plays the role of 
the witness.  
The victims play a very important role 
when accusing their offender and when 
they need to speak. 
4. Role of 
offender 
Shameful party, presumed 
innocent, right to keep 
silence. Not compelled to 
apologize to the victim or to 
admit offence. 
The offenders have a large role in 
defending themselves and in calling for 
their own witnesses and in testifying 
especially those who plead guilty. 
5. Adjudication  Sentencing by the judge. The sentence is given by a college of 
judges (7 inyangamugayo) 
6. Reconciliation  Reconciliation is not an aim 
and is not the business of the 
court. 
Reconciliation is one of the pillars of 
Gacaca but there is no proceeding 















if the Gacaca process goes well it ends by 
automatically reconciling the Rwandans. 
This belief has led survivors and 
perpetrators who have completed their 
punishment to be able to renew a good 
relationship in their village with the 
acceptance of a sincere apology and 
forgiveness  
7. Healing  Healing is not an aim, nor is 
it the business of the court. 
Healing is like reconciliation - it is 
something which comes progressively 
with the care that is given to the victim. 
Experiencing the truth about, and 
information on, the death of their loved 
ones has helped victims to heal through 
Gacaca. 
8. Role of the 
Government 
officials  
None. Independence of the 
judiciary.  
It does not intervene in decision making. 
Gacaca judges are independent. 
 
9. Role of the 
community 
None, no participation  Major and very important through 
community participation. 
10. Role of  
defence 
lawyers  
Very important and 
constitutes the right of 
defence. 
None. Everybody (the community) plays 
the role of defence lawyers for any 
offender. 
The comparison resulting between retributive justice and Gacaca courts shows that Gacaca 
courts are similar to retributive courts in a range of 40 per cent and different at a range of 60 per 
cent from retributive justice. 
d. Table of comparison of restorative justice and Gacaca courts using the ten elements 
as criteria of comparison. 
 
Elements of comparison Restorative justice Gacaca courts 
1. Main stakeholders  1. Victim, offender and 
facilitator(s) and the 
community. 
Community, victim and 
offender. The role of the 
community is mostly important 
because even when the victim 
had been killed, the Gacaca 















on the testimonies of the 
community. Judges are elected 
by the community.  
2. Punishment  2.  Reparation, apology, 
healing and reconciliation 
replace punishment (harm). 
No reparation but there is 
restitution of property. There is 
an apology which is vague 
3. Role of victim Major .First to talk about their 
needs. 
The victims play a very 
important role in Gacaca when 
they are available to make the 
accusations and they are 
allowed time to speak it 
through. 
4. Role of offender Respectable stakeholder, he 
must admit his offence but he 
is not compelled to. It is 
voluntarily. Needs to apologize 
to the victim. 
The offenders have a large role 
defending themselves and can 
call their ow  witnesses and 
give their own testimony 
especially those who plead 
guilty. But he is not treated with 
respect because of the gravity of 
the crime of genocide. 
5. Adjudication  No adjudication agent, the 
decision is made by consensus 
by the victim and offender 
through mediation. 
The sentence is given by a 
college of judges (7 
inyangamugayo) 
6. Reconciliation  Reconciliation is a target. Reconciliation is one of the 
pillars of Gacaca but there is no 
proceeding dedicated to that. 
Everybody believe that if the 
Gacaca process goes well it 
ends by reconciling 
automatically the Rwandans 
.But this belief has made 
survivors and perpetrators who 
had finished the punishment to 
start sincere apology and 
forgiveness and good 
relationship in their villages.  
 
 
7. Healing  Healing is an aim targeted by 
the restorative justice. 
Healing is like reconciliation it 
is something which comes 
progressively with the care that 
is given to the victim. 
Experiencing the truth about, 















their loved ones has helped 
victims to heal through Gacaca. 
8. Role of the 
Government 
officials  
None but in some area it is 
secondary ( role of diversion) 
It does not intervene in decision 
making. Gacaca judges are 
independent. 
 
9. Role of the 
community 
Major via participation.  Very important through 
community participation. 
Gacaca is nothing without the 
community. 
10. Role of  defence 
lawyers  
Not important  None. Everybody (the 
community) plays the role of 
defence lawyers for any 
offender. 
This second set of comparisons using different parameters shows that Gacaca courts are similar 
to restorative justice at a range of 5/10 and different at the same range of 5/10 
Section 4 The Real Nature of Gacaca Courts 
Both sets of comparisons of Gacaca courts, using different parameters, show, on the one table of 
comparison (d), that these courts are half restorative and half not, whereas, on the other table (a), 
they are more retributive. If we take an average, it shows that Gacaca courts differ considerably 
from restorative justice. 
Compared to retributive justice, Gacaca courts show, on the one hand, a similarity of 4/10 and a 
difference at a range of 6/10, whereas in the other table of comparison, the result of similarity 
was 3/4 and a difference of 1/4. This resulted in an average of similarity of 57.5 per cent between 
the Gacaca courts and retributive justice thus making Gacaca courts more similar to retributive 
justice. From the above comparison it can therefore be submitted that the real nature of Gacaca 
courts is more similar to retributive than restorative justice .The different tables have shown that 
the Gacaca courts compared to the very strict restorative justice lose similarity, while compared 
to the broader conception of restorative justice (as shown in the second comparison) gain 
similarity. 
The study has, however, shown greater similarity with retributive justice due to the fact that 















impunity” which emphasizes retributivism. In conclusion, there is some justification for those 
who have described Gacaca courts as being restorative, because they came into being in 2001 as 
an alternative to the formal courts. Those who call Gacaca courts retributive are disappointed by 
the fact that the punishments given are similar to those handed down in formal courts while these 
critics expected there to be a move away from punishment towards reparation and reconciliation 
between survivors and offenders.  
Although these results show that Gacaca courts are a mixture of restorative and retributive 
elements, this chapter has analysed these elements to reveal that the real nature of the courts is 
more retributive and less restorative. 
The statement by Gerry Johnstone and Daniel Van Ness that “to be credibly described as 
restorative justice,  it will usually have one or more of the following ingredients, which are 
presented in no particular order of importance” is confusing because they appear to side with 

















This dissertation has shown the extent to which Gacaca courts are retributive and restorative. By 
analysing the similarities and differences between the Gacaca and the retributive and restorative 
justice systems, this thesis has shown that the Gacaca contain elements of both but with a slant 
towards retributive justice. 
1. An overview 
This thesis has given an overview of the origin of the Gacaca courts in Rwanda and how they 
succeeded in trying over 1.2 million people accused of the international crime of genocide 
against the Tutsi during a civil war between RPF and the former Rwandan Government from 
1990 and 1994. These courts must be a first in the history of justice. 
Through a court of lay judges using a procedure designed to reveal to neighbours what had 
happened, how it happened and who bore the responsibility, Gacaca courts used popular 
participation at a local level to allow people to talk about what they saw during the genocide. 
This information allowed the judges to determine who were the accused and who the victims of 
the crimes committed during the genocide of Tutsi, and to use this information to conduct trials 
and issue judgment after hearing the accuseds’ contentions and the different views and 
testimonies of the public audience. 
Without any ill intention of criticism, Phil Clark has labelled the Gacaca courts “justice without 
lawyers”. Although they are courts without lawyers, they are courts of truth because they allow 
any member of the public to give testimony or suggestions about the accusation thereby acting as 
a lawyer for (or prosecutor against) the accused. It was a question of establishing the facts which 
everybody saw, because the genocide of Tutsi was executed publicly at a time when 
contemporaries did not hide or feel ashamed of committing those crimes. 
The strengths of Gacaca courts have been the participation of the population and the fact that 
they adopted approaches different to those of the formal criminal justice system which allowed 















Did the use of lay judges and the community make Gacaca courts a system of restorative justice? 
The findings of this study have revealed that they were more retributive, even if they were unlike 
the formal courts. 
The reasons for these differences lie in the reasons why these courts were initially instituted, as 
demonstrated in this thesis. The objective of Gacaca courts was to eradicate the culture of 
impunity which had evolved in Rwanda from 1959 to 1994 during which mass killing of Tutsi 
were carried out with impunity and without a sense of shame or wrongdoing. People needed to 
be made aware that such killings were wrong and discriminatory, because such impunity only 
occurred when the victims were Tutsi. They needed to be made aware of the feelings and the 
sufferings of the Tutsi so that they could start seeing them no longer as “the other” but as part of 
their community. They needed to be made aware, as a community, of the evils that were done in 
broad daylight with popular acquiescence and with no sense of guilt. These attitudes had to 
change so that Rwanda could take its place among the community of nations as a country with a 
culture of human rights and knowledge of good and evil. This could only be done by trying these 
cases within the community. 
The findings of this thesis distinguish the Gacaca courts of Rwanda from other forms of 
restorative justice, such as mediation and commissions of truth and reconciliation. For countries 
who would like to consider applying the methods of Gacaca courts themselves it is important for 
them to understand the differences. This knowledge will also be of help to scholars and 
researchers who will need clarity in their understanding of the Gacaca system. 
2. Recommendations for further research 
This thesis has discussed similarities with the sentencing circles model of restorative justice 
because the sentencing circle involves many victims and offenders together with their families 
and communities in trying to find a solution to conflicts much as is the case in Gacaca courts 
which also involves all the population of the village (cell) including the survivors and the 
accused. 
An analysis of these similarities would help to simplify an understanding of these systems. The 
Gacaca court system seems to be better for solving conflicts between two communities where 















of a neutral committee. One such example is the suggestion made by Job Ngugi that Gacaca 
courts be applied to handle the ethnically-based killings in post election Kenya in 2009. A 
thorough study based on this thesis would help to determine principles and strategies before 
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